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ARTICLES
THE THREE FACES OF EQUALITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
IN TAXATION
William B. Barkert
I. INTRODUCTION
The government's power to tax has been described by the United
States Supreme Court as an inherent power of sovereignty: "The
power... of taxation, operates on all persons and property belonging
to the body politic" and "has its foundations in society itself."' An
important truth that can be learned from modem history is that the
power to tax may well be the most important of all governmental
powers; not only does tax revenue make all other powers practically
possible, but tax in itself has enormous capacity to mold human activ-
ity. In the development of the modem state, one of the most important
movements has been the struggle to remove the power to tax from
monarchs and to place that power exclusively in the hands of legisla-
tors. Indeed, the principle "no taxation without representation" is not
simply a principle of representative democracy, but was also a pro-
scription in some early constitutions that conditioned the right to vote
on the fact of being a taxpayer.2
It is a maxim of constitutional democracy that government power
can only be exercised pursuant to certain conditions and limitations.
Thus, the power to tax, like other government powers, is naturally
circumscribed by constitutional norms that define the relationship
between government and citizen. One such constitutional norm that is
t Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University.
Visiting Professor of Law, The London School of Economics and Political Science. The author
thanks Martha Turner and Jennifer Beidel for their research and assistance.
I Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830).
2 See infra note 20.
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considered essential to a just system is equality. This precept was
included in various forms in some constitutions as early as the eight-
eenth century. Equality is arguably one of the most comprehensive
rights. However, though a fundamental right to equality in treatment
is contained in many constitutions, there are serious questions as to
what the right of equality adds to the constitutional dialogue today.
The idea of equality may be particularly problematic as a restraint
on governments' power to tax. In the modem context, it has been
noted: "Of course, there are no cases of gross human rights violations
in fiscal case law. In this respect, tax law usually focuses on relatively
trivial matters."3 The concept of equality, however, did not always
lack importance. When the principles of constitutional democracy
developed in Europe and the United States, a strong influence on the
ideology of the time was a fear of the unbridled exercise of state pow-
ers, in particular, the power to tax. The goal was not simply to replace
the arbitrary power of the sovereign with popularly elected legisla-
tures, but to check the arbitrary exercise of sovereign powers in gen-
eral via constitutionally mandated limitations.4
Early America was deeply influenced by John Locke's tenets on
taxation: that there should be "no taxation without representation" and
that the burden of taxation should be equally allotted among the citi-
zens of a society.5 The first tenet, "no taxation without representa-
tion," is accomplished through the formation of a democratic and
republican government. Based on Locke's conclusion, the second
tenet, equality, might be perceived as a logical outcome of a democ-
ratic order. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers
made the strongest arguments against the importance of a Bill of
Rights in a society governed by a constitution established by the peo-
ple. He explained that the Preamble to the American Constitution,
which proclaimed the establishment of the Constitution, was "a better
recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which
make the principle figure in several of our state bills of rights, and
Richard Happ6, The Netherlands, in THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN EUROPEAN
TAXATION 125, 153 (Gerard TK Meusen ed., 1999).
4 The historical importance of tax during times of intense social unrest also cannot be un-
derstated. For example, Charles I began his road to the executioner's block when he was forced
by financial crisis to recall Parliament in an effort to raise new taxes, and the American Revolu-
tion was precipitated by the British Parliament's imposition of new taxes on the American
Colonies. CHARLES ADAMS, FIGHT, FLIGHT, FRAUD: THE STORY OF TAXATION 191, 211-17
(1982).
5 John Locke, who deeply influenced thinking in America, concluded, "[i]t is fit everyone
who enjoys his share of the [govemment's] protection should pay out of his estate for the main-
tenance of it. But still it must be with his consent, i.e., the consent of the majority, given it either
by themselves or their representatives chosen by them." JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
ON GOVERNMENT 193 (Haffner Publ'g. 1947).
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which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a consti-
tution of government.",6 In other words, Hamilton thought a Bill of
Rights to be unnecessary because the very structure of democracy
guaranteed equality.
Yet Locke and later thinkers like David Hume recognized the hu-
man drive toward acquiring property or, as Hume put it, man's "avid-
ity" for "acquiring goods and possessions. 7 The acquisitive nature of
man even permeates the struggle over the fair allocation of the burden
of taxation on the citizens of a country. This human tendency is also
recognized in democratic society, as noted in a United States Supreme
Court opinion in 1895. 8
But there is another cause tending to introduce inequality in
the burdens of taxation of far greater effect than all the in-
stances of departure from the rule of equality which I have
just mentioned; and this is a cause which does not arise from
any consideration of the public good whatever, but from the
inherent selfishness of men. In every community those who
feel the burdens of taxation are naturally prone to relieve
themselves from them if they can; and the extent of the effort
which they make to relieve themselves is, in general, propor-
tionate to the extent of the burden which they suppose has
been laid upon them. One class struggles to throw the burden
off its own shoulders. If they succeed, of course it must fall
upon others. They also, in their turn, labor to get rid of it, and
finally the load falls upon those who will not, or cannot, make
a successful effort for relief. This is, in general, a one-sided
struggle, in which the rich only engage, and it is a struggle in
which the poor always go to the wall.9
As a result of this struggle between economic classes, some states
adopted constitutional provisions that require legitimate taxation to be
carried out in accordance with the principle of equality. As a societal
supernorm, equality in taxation is about the rights and obligations of
citizens and states in constitutional democracies.
6 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 555, 558-59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert B. Luce ed.,
1976).
7 DAVID HOME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 491-92 (Oxford Clarendon Press 1978)
(1888).
8 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 516 (1894), aff'd on reh'g,
158 U.S. 601 (1895). Pollock involved the constitutionality of the federal income tax. For fur-
ther discussion, see infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
9 Pollock, 157 U.S. 429 at 516.
20061
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
This paper explores the nature and force of equality as a constitu-
tional tax norm and studies equality's evolution, that is, its changing
face over time. Part II of this paper provides background information
on the fundamental premise of equality. Part Il discusses the ap-
proaches to equality in taxation found in several early constitutions.
Part IV of this paper considers the role of judicial review in deter-
mining what constitutes equal taxation. Though constitutions repre-
sent the fundamental law of a nation, their legal effect is ambiguous
and depends largely on the permissibility of judicial review. How and
by whom are constitutions enforceable? Are their precepts meant only
to be inspirational or to limit sovereign power? In societies without
judicial review, legislators interpret their constitutions' limitations
subject only to check by popular will. In societies that have embraced
the right of courts to review legislation for constitutional infirmity,
constitutional norms may contain both negative proscriptions that
defend individuals from government overreaching and positive direc-
tives that require governments to achieve certain societal goals. Since
this paper involves a look at equality as normative proscription, its
focus is on the history of judicial intervention in tax law, that is,
equality's force and meaning as a consequence of the constitutional
testing of tax statutes by the judiciary.
Even though judicial review has been accepted more and more as
an appropriate exercise of judicial power in democratic societies, its
widespread acceptance is a fairly recent development. Because of
this, this paper is primarily focused on the concept of equality in
America, for it was in America that judicial review of legislative acts
was established as appropriate well over 150 years before the concept
was accepted in Europe.
Part V of this paper looks to the traditions of three court systems,
the U.S. state courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court, to provide an informative contrast to help
explicate the constitutional concept of equality. Each represents a
different moment in the historical development of the precept of
equality. The first tradition, the law of state courts, originated in the
eighteenth century and is used to examine the notion of equality in the
constitutions of the states of the United States and its subsequent de-
velopment. This represents the earliest attempts by the judiciary to
establish a tradition of limitations on the governmental power to tax.
The second tradition is the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the
United States. The history of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
shows a move from an individual, rights-based concept of equality to
a regime that appears to have no real concept of equality in tax at all.
(Vol. 57:1
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The lesson here may be that a different theory of fairness, namely that
taxes should be assessed on the basis of ability to pay, has destroyed
the constitutional requirement of equality but has not replaced it with
an alternative approach, leading to almost complete deference to the
legislature in tax matters. The third tradition, the law of the German
Federal Constitutional Court, owes its development to the more recent
shifts to judicial review of tax in Europe. There, the Constitutional
Court has adopted a proactive concept of equality. In part, the Consti-
tutional Court draws on the thinking of the United States and reflects
both of the first two traditions. Yet, the traditional notion of equality
based on individual rights has also been transformed in Germany into
a substantive concept that adopts a social rights ethic requiring both
individual rights and governmental duties, both of which are founded
on the premise that equality in taxation means that tax must be ap-
plied on the basis of ability to pay.
Part VI of this paper concludes by suggesting that equality has de-
veloped into such an elusive concept that our systems of taxation do
not promote its goals. Yet, these goals are not beyond us and our ex-
perience with the concept of equality has taught us certain lessons that
may need to be relearned.
11. THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF EQUALITY IN TAXATION
To Aristotle, equality was the measure of justice; the unjust is un-
equal, the just is equal. 10 Justice is about determining and giving indi-
viduals their due. Aristotle perceived equality as a mean, that is, a
point between two extremes of what was unjust, finding what was just
to be "a species of the proportionate."11 Yet a person's just share of
money or honor could be equal or unequal to that of others 12 since
"what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some
sense." 13 Thus, a famous maxim developed from these principles is
that "things that are alike should be treated alike, and things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. ' ' 4
Modern democratic society adopted a more egalitarian principle of
equality by proclaiming that all men are created equal. This founda-
tional principle begins with a universal notion of equality depending
only on one's formal affiliation with the human race. It is this notion
10 2 ARISTOTLE, NICLOMACHEN ETHICS 1131a (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1925).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1130b.
13 Id. at l131a.
14 Id. at 1131a-b; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Profes-
sor Westin, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575, 578 n.17 (1983) (discussing Aristotle's idea of equality).
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of human status that is behind the law's ideal that all men are equal
before the law.
Thus, we see two quite different notions of equality. Aristotle
considers man as a member of civil society where wealth and honors
are unevenly divided. This also corresponds with Locke's natural
state.15 There, equality is a notion of justice by which each is treated
according to his just desserts. The proclamations of equality that arose
from the eighteenth century revolutions, however, deal with man and
his relation to the state. As a member of the body politic, each
member of the social order must be treated the same, without
differentiation. Yet, taxation in an eighteenth century sense allows the
state to share in the fruits of civil society. As such, tax must recognize
the inequality of man in civil society and confront the question of
rights and just desserts.
What is considered fair or just, that is, what individuals merit, de-
pends greatly on the specific values of societies, and there can be a
large divergence in views on this subject even among democratic
societies. Aristotle recognized long ago that people disagree as to the
standard for determining merit; thus, "democrats identify it with the
status of freemen, supporters of oligarchy with wealth, and supporters
of aristocracy with excellence."' 6 What one deserves can be based on
needs, aspirations, opportunities, and so forth. Modem society's over-
arching goals often include a more proportionate or equitable distribu-
tion of wealth.
The abyss between political man and civil man is profound. It
would be simple to achieve important social goals by passing a law
allowing those who are economically disadvantaged or the victims of
prejudice to cast more votes than others. For every year that a woman
or a person of color was denied the vote or other human dignities, she
would be entitled to an extra vote. This device might quickly establish
more significant proportionality in our societies. Certain political
rights, like the right to vote, are matters of formal equality. 17 History
teaches, however, that the question of who are men for purposes of
determining equal treatment does change. In Athens at the time of
15 Locke's state of nature was a state of perfect liberty and equality governed by natural
laws that require man to preserve the life and goods of others. See LOCKE, supra note 5, at 122-
24.
1 6 ARISTOTLE, supra note 10, at 1131a.
17 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. , art. IX, reprinted in CONSTITUlONS THAT
MADE HISTORY 46 (Albert P. Blaustein & Jay A. Sigler eds., Paragon House 1988). Note,
however, that in the United States the residents of each state, no matter how large its population,
are entitled to elect two U.S. Senators. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3. The weight of the vote of a
resident of a small state is disproportionately large as compared with the vote of a resident of a
large state.
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Aristotle, it was free men; in America at the time of the Declaration
of Independence, it was free men with property; 8 in France at the
time of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, it was
free men who paid taxes;19 and today in the United States, it is men
and women aged eighteen and over.20 Once the right holder is de-
fined, political equality is clear and unambiguous--one person, one
vote. The French expressed this in the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen as follows: "[Liaw is the expression of the gen-
eral will. All citizens have the right to take part, personally or through
their representatives, in its making. It must be the same for all,
whether it protects or punishes.'
Can this kind of formal equality be achieved in taxation? The an-
swer, of course, is yes. A poll tax or a head tax follows the principle
that every human being is as deserving as every other and should
share in the costs of government by paying the same as everyone else.
Considering the political person, there is something quite appealing in
the notion that since it is just that we all have the same political rights,
it is just that we all have the same "duty" to support the state. But
whereas political equality demands that the only relevant criterion is
our humanity, taxation necessarily takes us beyond political man to
social and economic man.
The difference is obvious. Political rights are all about the abstract
relation between citizens and their government. Taxation is instead
about government's need and its capacity to enter into civil society to
claim a portion of the economic wealth of a society. Taxation is con-
crete rather than abstract; it is a real claim on economic activity that
takes place. By nature and practicality, tax is imposed on people
based on an attribute that is not shared equally by all. Just as one can-
not get blood out of a turnip, one cannot get tax revenue from people
who lack the economic capacity to pay taxes. Taxation, as a practical
endeavor, must treat people differently because it is levied on eco-
nomic activity that is distributed unevenly. From this broader per-
18 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, ch. 1, § n, art. 1; pt. 11 ch. 1, § 111, art. IV, re-
printed in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 51, 54.
19 In France, the relationship between the mutual interdependence of full rights of citizen-
ship and the obligation to pay taxes was made a formal requirement in the French Constitution
of 1791. Only "active" citizens were entitled to sit and vote in the primary assemblies charged
with electing representatives to the national assembly. CONST. of 1791, tit. In, ch. I, § I, cl. I
(Fr.), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 89. In order to be an
active citizen, it was necessary "[t]o pay in some place within the kingdom a direct tax at least
equal to the value of three days labor." Id at tit. I1, ch. L § H, cl. 2.
20 U.S. CONST. amends. XIX, XXVI.
21 CONST. of 1789, DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN, art. 6 (Fr.), re-
printed in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 34 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2000).
But see U.S. CONST. amends. XIX, XXVL
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spective, the truth is that a formally equal tax can be in some cases the
most unequal of all taxes.
This does not mean, however, that equality has no force in tax.
Aristotle's concept of justice would sensibly require some kind of
proportionality in taxation. Adam Smith first applied this notion of
justice to taxation. Adam Smith's first canon of taxation was that
taxes should be equal or equitable.22 The burden of taxation should be
apportioned to a person on the basis of the benefits he received from
government goods and services.23 The benefit theory treats tax as a
market phenomena; it is an exchange theory of tax.24 Thus, in Adam
Smith's first canon of taxation he stated that "the subjects of every
state ought to contribute to the support of the government, as nearly
as possible in proportion to their respective abilities; that is the
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the
state. '25 Most likely, Smith was using ability to pay as the proper
measure of the benefit a person derived from the protection of the
state.
As we can see, Aristotle, John Locke, and Adam Smith provided
the philosophical foundation for a requirement of equality in taxation.
Their concerns over the potential for abuse in taxation led many so-
cieties to adopt provisions on equality in their constitutions.
Ill. THE EARLY CONSTITUTIONS: EQUALITY AND TAXATION
America's struggle for independence was founded upon the cor-
nerstone of equality when it was declared, "[w]e hold [this] truth[] to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal. 26 Surprisingly, neither
the original Constitution of the United States nor the Bill of Rights
contained any mention of equality.27 Though the Constitution did
contain an explicit limitation on the taxing power of Congress to the
effect that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform through-
out the United States, 28 this clause has been consistently interpreted
22 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk. 5, ch. 2, pt.2 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
G. P. Putnam's Sons 1904).
23 See William B. Barker, A Normative Approach to the Concept of Tax, in THE CONCEPT
OF TAX (K. Van Raad, B. Peters & W. Barker eds., forthcoming 2006).
24 Id.
25 SMITH, supra note 22.
26 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
27 James Madison may have provided the explanation for the absence of a requirement of
equality when he remarked, after reviewing the constitutions of state governments that had
equality clauses, "in some instances they do no more than state the perfect equality of mankind;
this to be sure is an absolute truth, yet it is not absolutely necessary to be inserted at the head of
a constitution." WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 188 (Univ. of N.C.
Press 1973).
U8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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to mean only geographical uniformity, that is, the same tax must be
applied in the same way throughout the United States.29 It was not
until the Civil War Amendments were passed, which provided that no
state could deny any person the equal protection of the law, that the
notion of equality became part of the Constitution.3°
Though the Federal Constitution did not have an equality clause,
many state constitutions passed at the time of the revolution and prior
to the enactment of the Federal Constitution did. Many provisions
were patterned after the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which de-
clared "[tihat all men are by nature equally free and independent. 31
Several of these early constitutions contained specific provisions
on the underlying justification for taxation.32 Pennsylvania in 1776
declared "[t]hat every member of society hath a right to be protected
in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound
to contribute his proportion towards the expense of that protection.,
33
Rhode Island, years later, expressed this condition in its constitution
as follows: "[T]he burdens of the State ought to be fairly distributed
among its citizens." 34 Other states made equality in taxation more
definite by requiring that legislatures may levy only "proportional and
reasonable... taxes. 35
29 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 92 (1900).
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31 VA. CONST. OF 1776, BILL OF RIGHTS, § 1, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE
HISTORY, supra note 17, at 11. See also the PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, reprinted in
CONSTIrUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 25, which declared, "[tihat all men are
born equally free and independent."
32 From 1776 to 1784, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont adopted similar provisions. WADE J. NEWHOUSE, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY
AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 1727 (2d ed. 1984).
33 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, su-
pra note 17, at 26. Vermont adopted the same language in 1793. VT. CONST. of 1793, reprinted
in THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3762 (Francis Newton Thorp ed., 1909). The provision in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 gave each individual the "right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, conse-
quently, to contribute his share to the expense of his protection." MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. L
art. 10, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 46. Indeed, in
Pennsylvania, the constitution went so far as to admonish the legislature and provide guidelines
for carrying out its great responsibility:
Section 41. No public tax, custom or contribution shall be imposed upon, or paid by
the people of this state, except by a law for that purpose: And before any law be
made for raising it, the purpose for which any tax is to be raised ought to appear
clearly to the legislature to be of more service to the community than the money
would be, if not collected; which being well observed, taxes can never be burdens.
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 41, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at
35.
3 R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. 1, § 2, reprinted in 8 SOURCEs AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 386 (William F. Swindler ed., Oceana 1979).
35 MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. 1, § 1, art. IV, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT
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Other countries' early constitutions also made specific reference to
the principle of equality in taxation. The French Constitution of 1791
contained guarantees of natural and civil rights, including the follow-
ing specific references to the apportionment of the tax burden among
its citizens: "For the maintenance of the public force and for the ex-
penses of administration a general tax is indispensable; it ought to be
equally apportioned among all the citizens according to their
means.',36
Spain's provision emphasized only the obligation to pay taxes and
not the relationship between benefit and taxes. The Spanish Constitu-
tion of 1812, nevertheless, made the most forceful statement of equal-
ity in taxation when it declared that, "[e]very Spaniard is likewise
bound, without any distinction, to contribute in proportion to his
means, to the expenses of the state., 37 In Bolivia, the Constitution of
1826 emphasized the theme that all taxes should be equally imposed
on taxpayers by declaring, "[t]he Taxes shall be fairly imposed, with-
out either exception or privilege., 38 Thus, earlier constitutions empha-
sized various aspects of the concept of equality in taxation. Their
force as a binding rule, however, depended upop the role courts
played in the enforcement of constitutional provisions.
IV. EQUALITY AND TAXATION: THE ROLE OF JUI ICIAL REVIEW
Though many systems may be described as constitutional systems,
they can vary dramatically depending on the legal role constitutions
play. Constitutions begin by establishing or legalizing the political
order. Constitutions also set forth the parameters for the exercise of
sovereignty. But do constitutions establish rights of citizens that are
enforceable against the government? The traditionil answer was no.
Even though the constitutions of many countries were based on the
inalienable rights of individuals, judicial review of !legislative acts to
determine their validity in the face of constitutional rights was not a
MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 50; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. IL art. II, reprinted in THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE STATES, TERRITORIES AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, supra note 33.
36 CONST. of 1791 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN, art. 13 (Fr.), re-
printed in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 84-85.
31 CONSTrrUCI6N [C.E.] tit. L ch. 1H, art. 8 (Spain), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT
MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 118.
38 CONST. OF THE BOLIVIAN REPUBLIC of 1826, tit. XL cl. I11, reprinted in
CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note 17, at 180.
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valid exercise of the judicial power. This left the interpretation of
constitutional rights to the self-imposed limits of the legislature.39
In this context, is a constitutional limitation truly a norm? It must
be said that its utility lies in its inspirational value as a reminder to
legislators and the people. Ultimately, a constitutional limitation com-
mands legislators to judge themselves and commands the people to
judge their legislatures. This tradition can be seen quite clearly in the
French tradition, which gave the judiciary no power to dispense with
a statute and, thus, confined the role of the judge to the faithful appli-
cation of the statute.40 Indeed, this strong democratic disposition was
initially supported in some American articles and was addressed spe-
cifically in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which stated that
"no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the legis-
lature, or its authority.
' 41
In general, however, most Americans did not have the same fear of
judicial power that the French had. Long before the United States
Supreme Court established its power to determine the constitutional-
ity of legislation in Marbury v. Madison42 in 1803, courts in New
Jersey in 1780,43 Rhode Island in 1787,44 and North Carolina in
178745 all declared laws of their legislatures incompatible with rights
established by their state constitutions and, thus, void. This began the
American tradition of judicial review that is generally described as a
decentralized approach, which gives the power to review statutes for
their compatibility with constitutional prescriptions to all courts in the
judicial system.46 Cases, whether they involve common law or equity,
statutes or constitutions, are resolved by the same courts under the
same procedures.
'9 See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
40 For a discussion of the role of judges and courts, see William B. Barker, Statutory In-
terpretation, Comparative Law and Economic Theory: Discovering the Ground of Income
Taxation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 821, 871 (2003).
41 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. 9, § 12, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY,
supra note 17, at 26.
42 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
43 ROBERT VON MoscHIisKER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION 30-33 (Da Capo Press
1971) (discussing Holmes v. Walton, 9 N.J.L. 444 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1780)).
THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (discussing Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. Sup.
Ct. 1786)).
45 Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 48 (1787).
46 See MAURO CAPPELLETI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14
(Bobbs-Merrill 1979).
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On the contrary, in Europe, with the exception of Austria,47 there
was little judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation until
after World War II. In the aftermath of World War 11, many European
countries established new constitutional systems and adopted a model
of judicial review quite different from that of the United States. Under
this model, constitutional review is relegated to a single court that has
sole jurisdiction over constitutional matters.48 Constitutional review is
its only jurisdiction. This is best described as the centralized model of
judicial review. 49 Until quite recently, the constitutional review of tax
legislation pursuant to the requirement of equality did not occur in
Europe. Consequently, the European experience must be viewed in
the context that judicial consideration of the nature of equality in
taxation commenced in a world that had experienced much since the
eighteenth century.
V. THE CHANGING FACE OF EQUALITY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
TAx NORM
Since the changing face of equality as a constitutional tax norm
developed over time, this section starts with the early American ex-
perience, particularly relating to the American states' constitutional
review. The changing attitude toward equality and judicial interven-
tion, which is best captured by the United States Supreme Court's
decisions on equal protection, will be addressed second. Finally, a
striking new face of equality that has emerged in apparent co-
existence with prior conceptions will be considered by examining the
jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court.
A. The Concept of Equality Before the State Courts in the
United States
An important cause of the American Revolution was the perceived
unfairness of British taxation. The cry of "no taxation without repre-
sentation" was inspired by John Locke's maxim of just taxation,
which stated that "[legislators] must not raise taxes on the property of
the people without the consent of the people, given by themselves or
their deputies." 50 But Locke also recognized a citizen's duty to pay
47 Austria, unlike other countries, provided for judicial review by the High Constitutional
Court before World War 11 in 1920. See Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in
CONSTITTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
ABROAD 44-46 (Louis Henken & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
48 Id. at 40-42.
49 CAPPELLETi & COHEN, supra note 46.
50 LOCKE, supra note 5. The Massachusetts Constitution incorporated this precept. MASS.
CONST. OF 1789, pt. I, art. XXII, reprinted in CONSTrrrTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, supra
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taxes.51 These sentiments were reflected in several American states'
constitutions. For example, in 1776, Pennsylvania's Constitution de-
clared "[t]hat every member of society hath a right to be protected in
the enjoyment of life, liberty and property, and therefore is bound to
contribute his proportion to the expense of that protection ....52
What implications do these principles have when they have been
made constitutional norms? The precept requiring taxation only when
there is representation guarantees a governmental form that should
lead to fair taxation. In 1830, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the
United States Supreme Court, addressed this hope of representative
government as follows: "[Tihe interest, wisdom, and justice of the
representative body, and its relations with its constituents, furnish the
only security against unjust and excessive taxation, as well as against
unwise taxation. 53 In addition to the adoption of representative gov-
ernment, many state governments adopted provisions specifically on
taxation, with the simplest relating burden to benefit. Some states
found that from these simple constitutional 9recepts one necessarily
derived a requirement of equality in taxation.
How did the notion of equality affect the legislative power to tax?
The original purpose of equality in taxation was to prevent both privi-
lege and oppression. In ancient regimes, some were able to receive
exemptions from taxation while others without influence paid the
bulk of the taxes. Shifting from a monarch to a legislature was not
sufficient to guarantee fair taxation. The equality clause was meant to
prevent "spoliation by a dominant faction. 55
Many state constitutions adopted provisions on equality, uniform-
ity, or proportionality in tax over the course of the nineteenth cen-
56tury. Interestingly, even where there was no specific reference to
taxation in the Pennsylvania Constitution at the time,57 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania found such a limitation against arbitrary or
discriminatory tax was implied by the very notion of the power to tax.
note 17, at 48.
51 LOCKE, supra note 5.
52 PA. CONST. of 1776, art. VIII, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS THAT MADE HISTORY, su-
pra note 17, at 26. This provision was left out of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. See PA.
CONST. OF 1790, reprinted in SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 34. For other state constitutions that included similar language see supra note 33.
53 Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
5 See Cumberland & Pa. R.R., 40 Md. 22, 52 (1873).
55 City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 31 Ky. (9 Dana) 513 (1839).
56 For a comprehensive treatment of equality in state taxation, see NEWHOUSE, supra
note 32.
57 Pennsylvania's provision on taxes in its 1776 Constitution was left out of the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution of 1790. See id. at 1199.
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Accordingly, the court stated, "[i]t is the theory of a republican gov-
ernment that taxes shall be laid equally, in proportion to the nature of
the property; and when collected, shall be applied only to purposes in
which taxpayers shall have equal interest. 58 Indeed, a later Pennsyl-
vania case developed a notion of equality from the constitutional pro-
vision guaranteeing the "inherent and indefeasible right of men,"
which protects against "all unjust, unreasonable and palpably unequal
",59
exactions ....
The specific constitutional limitations on taxation adopted by the
states took various forms.60 These included requirements of equality,
uniformity, proportionality, and reasonableness of taxation on the
basis of value. Though the language varied, state courts uniformly
viewed these provisions as founded upon the requirement of equality
in taxation.
Though equality was the touchstone, there was a wide difference
of opinion on the precise meaning of equality and its constitutional
effect. The courts had to confront critical issues of interpretation. Did
the concepts apply to all taxes or only to property taxes? If all taxes,
did it apply to all taxes in the same way? Did equality require rigid
formalism such that the base had to be determined or measured in the
same way, or was there some flexibility such that only effective
taxation had to be approximately equal? Did equality require a
concept of universality so that any exemptions from taxation were
impermissible?
1. Unique Problems of Equality Posed by State Property Taxes
Some early thoughts on equality clearly reflected Adam Smith's
tax canons, which required taxes to be proportional or equal and re-
lated the burden of taxation to the benefit the taxpayer derived from
society.6' In 1862, a Wisconsin court concluded that "socially and
politically all are equal" and that "the burden of supporting the gov-
ernment should be borne equally by all the individuals composing it,
in proportion to the benefits conferred., 62 This treatment was based
on a simple assumption that one benefited in proportion to what one
owned.
This approach led to extreme limits on some states' power to tax
property. In those states, taxes had to be the same on all property, that
m Sharpless v. Major of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 168 (1853).
59 In re Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352, 363 (1871).
60 See NEWHOUSE, supra note 32, at 17-18.
61 SMrrH, supra note 22.
62 Knowlton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 9 Wis. 410,416-17 (1859), aff'd, 15 Wis. 600 (1862).
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is, the government could only tax on the basis of reasonably deter-
mined market value, the rates had to be the same on all classes of
property, and no exemptions were permitted. 63 The philosophy behind
these provisions was simple and straightforward. Since property could
be held in various forms, government should not burden one form any
more than any other, and exemptions of any kind were impermissible
because everyone had an obligation to pay a proportional tax on
whatever property they had. As put by the California Supreme Court,
the purpose of the constitution was "to secure that equality of taxation
which results from subjecting all property to the same burden."'6 That
court found that the legislature lacked power to provide exemptions
because "in all just systems of government, the burdens of taxation
should be distributed as equally as practicable.
65
Such a theory of equality in taxation faced difficult times when
considering the vast economic changes confronting society from the
nineteenth to twentieth centuries. Where land was the principle asset,
proportionate tax on value was practical. But as economies changed
and wealth was transformed from tangibles to intangibles and in-
comes from rents to profits, old notions of property were strained.
Even though some states still follow these basic precepts of equality
today, most have responded to the force of circumstances.
A very early case, Rhinehart v. Schuler,66 confronted this
predicament in a very unusual way. Faced with the impossibility of
valuing land in a frontier setting, the court decided that half a loaf was
better than none, so it approved an alternate valuation system. Though
some courts at this time viewed the notion of equality and uniformity
in taxation as requiring universality, that is, proportional taxation on
all property without exception, other courts, including the dissent in
Rhinehart, accepted the legislative power to discriminate among the
subjects of taxation by choosing to tax or not to tax or by applying
different rates to different kinds of property. But once a category of
property, such as real estate, was selected by the legislature, it was
generally assumed, even by the majority in Rhinehart, that the
dictates of equality and uniformity required universality within the
class; that is, the class of property would be taxed under the valuation
method, the same rate, and without exception. Without such
uniformity of taxation, it was concluded that some would be asked
unfairly to bear a disproportionate burden.
67
63 Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1, 15 (1853).
64 People v. McCreary, 34 Cal. 432,457 (1868).
6 id. at 460.
-7 111. (2 Giln.) 473 (1845).
67 Id. at 531-32 (Scates, J., dissenting).
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Clearly, such an approach grants some additional latitude to the
legislature since it affords that body the power to classify property for
purposes of differential taxation. One must consider the question of
how great a breach this is in the traditional notion of equality. Classi-
fication implies selecting previously undifferentiated subjects for un-
equal treatment. Does this constitutionally transform the requirement
of equality into mere formal equality before the law by which all who
fall within a legislative classification must be treated the same, or
does the constitution still necessitate substantive equality requiring
that there be appropriate reasons for the classification? According to
the dissent in Rhinehart, and to many courts in the nineteenth century,
it was the latter. To many, real property was an obvious, discrete clas-
sification such that the legislators lacked the power to differentiate
among its types. Indeed, this was a fairly prevalent attitude at the time
and its force was recognized and generally accepted even by the ma-
jority in Rhinehart when it upheld the statute.
In this context, the majority felt constricted by the practical di-
lemma of having to value property located on the frontier where ap-
praisals simply could not be made. The majority upheld a different
system of valuation for such property based on the assumption that
actually trying to find a market value for such property would pro-
duce vastly inconsistent results; even more intense than the problem
inherent in systems of property taxation that must rely on subjective
judgment of value. Thus, in the majority's opinion, adhering to a
strict standard of equality would result in disaster: "Taxes would thus
become unequal, the burdens of government would not be equitably
distributed among our citizens, all uniformity would be destroyed,
and the object of the constitution would not be accomplished.,, 68 This
may well be one of the earliest judicial expressions of a view of the
inherent contradiction within the concept of equality that adherence to
a formal concept of equality can beget real inequality. According to
this view, the legislature should not be restricted by such a formal
notion of equality in the appropriate situation.
The Rhinehart decision did not reflect the majority of the states at
that time. Indeed, it did not even represent the law in Illinois for
long.69 Nevertheless, it did form part of a common history of the
American state courts' struggles to define the parameters of legisla-
tive power in terms of the principle of equality. Moreover, even
though the principle of equality has lost some of its force over the
68 Id. at 515-16.
69 Several years later, llinois reasserted a doctrine of strict equality in taxation, requiring
strict uniformity. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 32, at 269-73.
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years, state courts continue to take the constitutional mandates seri-
ously and to subject state legislation to significant examination for
constitutional compliance.
An example is a 1949 Massachusetts case70 that dealt with the
question of whether certain legislative exemptions from the general
property tax were permitted. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rec-
ognized that not all general principles could "be applied with absolute
literal exactness" 7 1 and that "[s]ome exemptions founded upon com-
pelling reasons are permissible. 7 2 The Court asserted, however, that a
compelling reason justifying discrimination was just that, a compel-
ling reason. The Court concluded:
It is manifest from the language of the Constitution, and from
the legislation under it, that all property within the Common-
wealth, which is owned and held in such a way that it ought
to be available by its owner to increase his ability and enlarge
his duty to assist in defraying the expenses of the govern-
ment, must be included in the property upon which assess-
ments are made.73
This standard left little room for exemptions; only the property of
charitable or religious organizations or cases involving hardship could
be legitimately excluded from the general property tax by the
legislature.
The change in economic activity during the nineteenth century cre-
ated great challenges to the formal, or classical, equality theory. The
simple forms of property ownership of the eighteenth century had
been augmented dramatically by the growth of new economic activ-
ity, especially in manufacturing, and by the creation of vast new
forms of wealth in intangibles. Legislators were attracted for many
reasons, both laudable and not, to the benefits that tax advantages
provided to both old and new businesses that remained or located in a
state. This led directly to cries of unfairness by taxpayers and to con-
stitutional amendments that attempted to revitalize classical notions
of equality.
The growth of intangible wealth presented particular problems in
taxation due to the difficulty of using actual value as the tax base.
Corporate shares, for example, presented particular problems for as-
sessment based on market value. In many cases, the adoption of in-
70 Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1949).
71 Id. at 226.
72 Id.
73 Id. (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.E. 449, 502 (Mass. 1907)).
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come tax systems was spurred on by the acknowledgment that income
tax was the only effective way to deal with such intangibles. 74 In ad-
dition, taxing representative property involved potential double taxa-
tion to the extent that the property represented had already been taxed
in another's hands. For example, a debtor taxpayer could be taxed on
the full value of financed property while at the same time the creditor
was taxed on the value of the debt. Courts differed on whether ex-
emptions based on double taxation were permissible especially be-
cause such exemptions typically were overinclusive.75
Once some courts recognized the practical difficulties of treating
all property alike, some accepted that the principles of equality must
operate tax by tax. Some courts took the next step by approving clas-
sifications within a tax. Three categories of property were recognized
as having obvious differences: real property, tangible personal prop-
erty, and intangible personal property. Courts varied considerably.76
Argument focused on the economic or administrative justifications
that reflected the nature and practicalities of the particular tax. At the
same time courts struggled with the niceties of the requirements of
equality in property taxation, they began to accept the use of tax dis-
crimination to advance appropriate public purposes unrelated to the
general purposes of taxation to collect revenue on a fair and reason-
able basis. There is still resistance to these latter kinds of justification
today.77
2. Unique Problems of Equality Posed by State Income Taxes
Subjecting tax legislation to a proactive requirement of equality
was commonly understood as an appropriate exercise of judicial re-
view. The commonly adopted approach in the states emphasized a
formal, classical notion of equality that was initially tied to property
taxation.
Income taxation provided the most difficult challenge to the classi-
cal notion of equality and, in many cases, led to the substantial con-
traction of its force. But this was not the result in every state. The
confrontation of classical views of equality with changing perception
74 Tennessee, for example, constitutionally authorized the income taxation of stocks and
bonds to the extent they were not taxed under property tax laws. See Shields v. Williams,
19 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. 1929). See generally DICK NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX
138-141 (1961).
75 See NEWHOUSE, supra note 32, at 1833-34.
76 See Gottlieb v. City of Milwaukee, 147 N.W.2d 633 (Wis. 1967) (exemptions, but not
partial exemptions, allowed); Wright v. Steers, 179 N.E.2d 721 (Ind. 1962) (classifications, but
not exemptions, allowed).
77 For a comprehensive examination of those trends, see NEWHOUSE, supra note 32, at
1769-1922.
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of social needs expressed in income taxation demonstrates the differ-
ing and changing value choices facing modem society.
The challenge of taxing representative or intangible property under
notions of proportionality and market value first led state legislatures
to use "property" taxes based on annualized value, that is, value based
on capitalization of the income stream.78 As a property tax, such an
approach was often problematic in terms of the requirements of uni-
formity. A changed strategy based on income taxation that taxed in-
tangible income streams directly had greater success.
Income taxation, more than any other system of taxation, presents
the fundamental problem of defining equality in taxation. Initially, in
some states, the principles of equality were considered to apply uni-
formly to all taxes without exception; thus, they were subject to the
same rules, that is, the same base (value) and the same effective rates,
without exceptions. But in many cases, strict notions of equality were
only deemed applicable to property taxes either due to the precise
wording of the constitutional provision or because judicial construc-
tion dictated that these standards of equality were not applicable to
the characteristics and attributes of non-property tax bases. Courts
first explored the essential nature of the income tax to determine
whether it was simply a tax on property.
The State of Massachusetts is one example of a state that only ap-
plied strict uniformity to property taxation. Yet, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts concluded that "[iln its essence a tax upon income
from property is a tax upon the property., 79 Thus, the court declared
the income tax statute unconstitutional because it used a different
standard of value, resulting in a lack of uniformity in effective rates.
In 1918 a Missouri court upheld an income tax while admitting
that income tax was in one sense a tax on property and labor.8° Other
states, however, concluded that income taxes were simply not taxes
on property.8' Often, income taxes were simply classified as non-
property excise taxes. 82 The oft-repeated view was that an income tax
was a tax on a privilege or on the right to produce, create, receive, or
enjoy and not on any specific property.83 The basic justification for
7 See Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.E. 570, 573 (Mass. 1915) (holding that taxes that are
not proportional are unconstitutional).
79 Id. at 574.
80 Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Wollbrink, 205 S.W. 196, 201 (Mo. 1918) (holding that the
income tax does not contravene "any of the limitations imposed on their [the legislature's]
action by the constitution.").
81 See, e.g., Featherstone v. Norman, 153 S.E. 58, 64 (Ga. 1930) (holding that the taxation
of income is not taxation of property).
82 Id.; see also State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, M & N, R.R. Co., 104 S.O. 689 (Miss. 1924).
83 See Diefendorf v. Gallett, 10 P.2d 307, 315 (Id. 1932) (holding that "a tax upon net in-
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tax was now perceived differently. Tax was no longer justified as a
cost imposed for the government's protection of one's property. In-
stead, income tax was a cost conferred on the taxpayer by the gov-
ernment for the privilege of using one's labor and property.
Some courts went further and regarded income tax as sui generis.
Often, these courts rejected the market-oriented benefit or license
approach to taxation. These courts found that members of society had
an affirmative duty to pay taxes in accordance with the equitable basis
of ability to pay regardless of the actual benefit they derived from
government. This led to a different notion of the ideal of equality that
justified both graduated rates and exemptions as reasonable classifica-
tions on the basis of ability to pay. 84 This new notion of equality
abandoned strict uniformity adopting its opposite-progressive taxa-
tion.85 According to one court,
[t]he basic principle underlying.., such classifications is the
ability of the taxpayer to pay. Many economists and students
of government regard a progressive tax as more just and
equal in point of sacrifice than a proportional one, since
persons with large incomes can more readily spare a fixed
portion of their income than those who have difficulty in
sustaining themselves upon what they receive each year.
86
In order to free legislators to adopt this more egalitarian view of
equality in tax, courts moved toward a more liberal view of the stan-
dard of review for testing tax legislation against the precepts of equal-
ity. In some cases this standard requires only minimum rationality,
which is similar to modern federal equal protection analysis.
87
Though the retreat from classical notions of equality represents the
overwhelming trend, an important judicial debate over the nature of
equality as a constitutional norm in taxation took place in the latter
half of the twentieth century in Pennsylvania in Amidon v. Kane.
88
come is not a tax upon property... such a tax is an excise tax.").
84 See Reed v. Bjornson, 253 N.W. 102, 105 (Minn. 1934) (holding that people enjoy the
protections offered by stable society and have an obligation to pay for it).
8 "A proportionate tax is one in which the average tax (total tax/tax base) is the same as
the tax base of the taxpayer increases. A progressive tax is one in which the average tax in-
creases as the tax base of the taxpayer increases. A regressive tax is one in which the average
tax decreases as the tax base of the taxpayer increases." Barker, supra note 23 (manuscript at
10 n.24, on file with author).
86 Bacon v. Ranson, 56 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Mo. 1932).
87 See Standard Lumber Co. v. Pierce, 228 P. 812, 818 (Or. 1924) (holding that a gradu-
ated income rate does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). For consideration of federal
developments, see infra Part V.C.
9 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971) (holding that the tax structure did not meet requirements of the
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This case demonstrates the continued rigor of the application of the
concept of equality to the income tax.
Prior to Amidon, the particular significance of the notion of
equality in Pennsylvania can be attributed in part to the state's
specific experience. The language of the modem uniformity clause in
Pennsylvania requires that taxes be uniform on the same class of
subjects. 89 This rather permissive requirement recognizes the right of
the legislature to classify the subject matter of tax and to apply
different rates to different classes. Thus, the courts recognized income
as a separate class.9° The notion of equality in Pennsylvania that was
applied to income taxation was a strict one. The subject had to be
taxed uniformly, the base had to be determined in the same way, the
rates had to be proportional, and exemptions not authorized by the
constitution were not allowed.9 1 Two unique features were also
relevant to the particular situation in Pennsylvania. First, both in 1913
and 1928, the people of Pennsylvania rejected a constitutional
amendment providing for progressive taxation.92 Second, in 1968, the
constitution was amended to allow legislation to establish classes
based on age, disability, infirmity, or poverty for those who are in
need of special exemptions or tax provisions. 93
Thereafter, Pennsylvania adopted an income tax with a flat rate.
The state used a technique utilized by many states in America; it
piggy-backed on the federal system by adopting the federal tax base
for state purposes. The tax was soon challenged on the basis that it
violated the requirements of equality and uniformity.94 The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court asserted that the principle of uniformity applied
to the income tax95 and that all taxes must satisfy the requirement of
"substantial equality of the tax burden." 96 That meant that people in
similar situations had to be taxed the same. As a general principle,
once a tax is imposed upon a particular class, "[p]art of the class may
uniformity clause of the state constitution).
89 PA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
90 Though Pennsylvania courts initially classified income as property and concluded that it
constituted one class for purposes of determining equality in taxation, that view was abandoned.
See Turco Paint & Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 181 A. 37 (1936) (upholding corporate income tax
as a privilege tax).
91 Kelly v. Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935).
92 Id.
93 Amidon, 279 A.2d at 66 (Bell, C.J., concurring) (discussing 72 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 7302.2(b)(ii) (West 1971)).
94 Id. at 67 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 58.
96 Id. at 66.
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not be excused, regardless of the motive behind the action."97 Thus,
people who were in similar circumstances were those with compara-
ble amounts of the tax base. The tax base for comparing taxpayers
was each person's portion of total net income.
Certainly, the justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not
expect perfect equality and recognized a necessary tolerance for the
practicalities of raising revenue and of achieving a fair and equitable
allocation of the burdens of government. The court found, however,
that many aspects of the federal income tax base created severe ine-
qualities rendering the state tax unconstitutional. For example, the tax
was replete with preferences and special exemptions that were based
not on the natural exigencies of taxation but on furthering certain non-
tax political and social policies.98
The court reviewed the situations of "typical taxpayers [with the
same income] claiming representative exemptions and deductions." 99
In examining hypothetical taxpayers who differed as to items like the
exclusion for certain interest income and the deductions for home
mortgage interest, retirement plans, and charitable contributions, to
name a few, the court found a range of disparate treatments. It was the
court's view that these hypothetical taxpayers were similarly situated
because they had enjoyed the same privilege of 'receiving, earning
or otherwise acquiring' the same dollar amount of annual in-
come.... ."10 Yet, the taxpayers did not have to pay the same dollar
amount of taxes; indeed, their burden varied by as much as 50%.01 In
the words of the court, "These inequalities result, of course, from the
manifold tax preferences afforded taxpayers depending among other
things upon whether a particular taxpayer is a wage earner or self-
employed, renter or home owner, etc."' 0 2 Implicit in the court's dis-
cussion is the fact that these provisions create different obligations to
pay taxes that have nothing to do with either the benefit received by
the taxpayers or the taxpayers' abilities to pay. Moreover, these pro-
visions generally result in a greater proportion of tax on those people
who have a lesser ability to pay.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania in-
come tax law considered by the court had eliminated many of the tax
preferences that have inundated federal tax law. The Pennsylvania
scheme had started with the concept of "taxable income" (net income)
91 Id. at 68 (quoting Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 196 A.2d 664, 666 (Pa. 1964)).
SId. at 63.
99 Id. at 61.
100d. at 62.
101 Id. at 63.
102 Id. at 62.
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under the federal system that generally taxes profits stated in terms of
gross income minus any deductions associated with the cost of pro-
ducing that income. 10 3 The Pennsylvania statute had, however, added
back into the income tax base many of the business and investment
tax preferences allowed by federal law, including the difference be-
tween accelerated depreciation and economic depreciation, excess
investment interest, excess depletion, and the capital gains differen-
tial.' °4 From the court's perspective, however, the legislature had not
gone far enough to eliminate the inequality. Tax preferences violated
the concept of equality regardless of their non-tax, social rationale.
The court concluded:
Whether or not these or any or all of the myriad other tax
preferences implicit in Article II of the Tax Reform Code of
1971 might be thought to serve some useful social policy, the
fact remains that unequal burdens are being imposed ....
These pervasive and impermissible discriminations between
similarly situated taxpayers render Article Ill invalid.'15
Pennsylvania does have a valid income tax law today, but it bears
the clear imprint of this view of equality. 1°6 The present law is the
product of a rigorous attempt to exclude all sources of preference in
business and individual income deductions, including deductions for
personal consumption. Pennsylvania may well represent the closest
attempt at comprehensive income taxation found in the world today.
B. The General Concept of Equality Before the Federal Courts in the
United States
It was not until the aftermath of the Civil War that the United
States Constitution contained a provision on equality. Neither the
original Constitution nor the original Bill of Rights mentioned
equality. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted after the Civil War,
provides, "nor shall any state ...deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 7 Though equal
protection of the laws only applied to state governments by its terms,
it was thought to be inherent in the concept of due process, which was
10372 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (West 1971), repealed by 1986 Pa. Laws 318.
104Amidon, 279 A.2d at 55 n.2 (citing 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7302(q) (West. 1971)).
105 Id. at 63.
06 See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7302, 7302 (2006).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (passed by Congress June 13, 1866, ratified July 9,
1868).
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a limitation on federal power under the Fifth Amendment.10 8 This
principle was not clearly established, however, until 1954 in the case
of Bolling v. Sharpe.'
0 9
In the late nineteenth century, an important debate took place be-
fore the United States Supreme Court concerning the nature of equal-
ity and the federal income tax in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co." In Pollock, the federal income tax law was challenged on the
basis of its incompatibility with the following provision: "No Capita-
tion, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.""' The
Court determined that the income tax was unconstitutional because it
was a direct tax laid in violation of the proportionality requirement.
The question of equality and the income tax was also a central issue.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Field concluded that "another consid-
eration against the law" was the principle of equality." 
2
Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, recognized that the notion
of equality, derived from the essential idea of tax, did impose certain
fundamental limitations on tax legislation. " 3 He also found that sev-
eral features of the particular income tax before the Court were defec-
tive, but that the act could be sustained without them. 114 Justice
Harlan argued that modem notions of justice did not require precise
equality. He noted that taxes on consumable goods were alleged to
frequently ignore principles of equality, but that under the practical
conditions of life, no one is the same. Thus, he concluded that classi-
cal or formal equality in taxation requiring proportionality was not
truly equal because it ignored taxpayers' abilities to pay.''
5
Harlan's concept of equality perceives a different objective
underlying the need for fairness in taxation. One of the basic tenets of
classical equality was that there should be no privileges in taxation
because "the greatest source of inequality" is the practice of those
who try to shift tax to someone else. The new concept of equality
108 The Fifth Amendment, which was part of the original Bill of Rights, provides, in part,
"No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
1-9347 U.S. 497 (1954).
110 157 U.S. 429 (1895), affd on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1896), overruled by South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, recognized by U.S. v.
Baker, 874 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Pollock I].
IIU.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.112 Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 592-93 (1895) (Field, J., concurring).
113 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 676 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
[hereinafter Pollock 11]. Note that it was not until later that the Court acknowledged that the
equal protection of the law required by the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the federal gov-
ernment as well as the states. See infra note 160.
114 Pollock 11, 158 U.S. at 676.
115 Id. at 675-76.
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transforms the formal equality of proportionality in tax into a
substantive equality of permissive, or even required,
disproportionality in order to combat the advantages or disadvantages
afforded particular classes by society. Significant differentiation
among taxpayers is necessary in order to redress economic
inequality.11 6 These approaches differ on how taxpayers are judged to
be similar or dissimilar, and how such differences are weighed.
Classical equality theory addresses the equal application of tax based
on mathematical means whereas ability to pay seeks to address
inequality of circumstances.
Justice Harlan, however, admitted that the income tax law con-
tained certain objectionable exemptions that were not based on con-
siderations of ability to pay. 117 In his view, these could be invalidated
without invalidating the entire law. 1 8 Thus, equality as measured by
ability to pay still should limit legislative tax authority appropriately
when exemptions are not based on ability to pay.
It did not take long for even this more limited scope for constitu-
tional equality to fade from modem thought. Though during the latter
part of the nineteenth century state courts were struggling with the
problems of taxation and classical notions of equality, federal courts
viewed the Equal Protection Clause quite differently. In Bells Gap
R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania,1 9 the Supreme Court was asked to review a
state tax on corporate securities for which the tax base was measured
by the securities' nominal or face value, rather than their fair market
value. Under a view of equality requiring universality, meaning that
all property must be treated in the same way, 120 the different methods
of valuation would have been a violation of the principle of equality.
In finding no defect in the legislation, the Court rejected the argument
that equality required strict uniformity. Instead, the Court found that
in taxation "the law does not make any discrimination in this regard
which the State is not competent to make."' 12 1 The Court concluded:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to compel the
State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. If that were its
proper construction .... it would render nugatory those dis-
criminations which the best interests of society require, which
116 See Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 505-06, 514-16.
17 Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For example, the exemptions for
large amounts of accumulated capital such as those available to savings banks, mutual insurance
companies, and loan associations. Id. at 675.
1181d
.
19 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
120 See supra text accompanying notes 64-67 for a description of this approach.
121 Bells Gap, 134 U.S. at 237.
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are necessary for the encouragement of needed and useful in-
dustries, and the discouragement of intemperance and vice,
and which every State, in one form or another, deems it expe-
dient to adopt.
22
The Court hinted at a much more limited role for equal protection in
the defense of individual rights, suggesting that "clear and hostile
discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially such
as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our gov-
ernments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition."'
123
Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert,124 a case decided just two years
later, illustrates the beginnings of the transformation of the notion of
equality. The Court saw a necessary relationship between discrimina-
tion and equality in taxation:
This court has repeatedly laid down the doctrine that diversity
of taxation, both with respect to the amount imposed and the
various species of property selected either for bearing its bur-
dens or for being exempt from them, is not inconsistent with
a perfect uniformity and equality of taxation in the proper
sense of those terms; and that a system imposes the same tax
upon every species of property, irrespective of its nature or
condition or class, will be destructive of the principle of uni-
formity and equality in taxation and of a just adaptation of
property to its burdens.
1 25
Here the Court is neither speaking of taxation according to ability to
pay, nor speaking precisely of taxation according to the benefit de-
rived by the taxpayer from the government. Instead, this is dispropor-
tionate taxation according to the burden or societal cost of different
kinds of property. Such exceptions to the requirement of universality
are clearly warranted. The Court did not explain, however, how or by
whom these determinations were to be made.
Shortly after the Supreme Court declared the federal income tax
unconstitutional in Pollock,126 the Supreme Court was confronted
with the question whether progressive taxation violated the Equal
Protection Clause. In Magoun v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank,
127
an 1897 case, the Supreme Court upheld Illinois' graduated rates of
122Id.
123 Id.
124 142 U.S. 339 (1892).
125 Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
126 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
127 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
[Vol. 57:1
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN TAXATION
tax on inheritances. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Equal
Protection Clause "only requires the same means and methods to be
applied impartially to all the constituents of a class so that the law
shall operate equally and uniformly upon all persons in similar
circumstances."' 28 Legislatures, however, do not have unlimited
powers to classify. A permissible classification "is one based upon
some reasonable ground-some difference which bears a just and
proper relation to the attempted classification-and [which] is not a
mere arbitrary selection,"'129 or put differently, one based upon "some
difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted
classification.' 130 Though the Court set forth this test, it never
analyzed the reasonableness of the classifications. 3' Instead, the
Court, recognizing that there were six classifications based on
amount, determined that the classifications were permissible because
the tax operated uniformly within each class. 32 The dissenting
opinion by Justice Brewer, who had authored the controlling authority
cited by the majority, 133 found the tax unequal because it was based
on a purely arbitrary classification, wealth, which made the tax
directly and intentionally unequal. The majority avoided responding
to this assertion.
One particular feature of the Illinois tax bears closer scrutiny. The
graduated rates in the Illinois tax operated on the entire amount trans-
ferred. For example, the tax was 3% on up to $10,000, but 4% on the
entire amount if the total was over $10,000, and so forth. Thus, one
who received $10,000 paid $300 netting $9,700, whereas one who
received $10,001 paid $400.04 netting $9,600.96 therefore netting
$99.04 less than the person who had been bequeathed less.' 34 There
was no indication in the case that the classification scheme had any
purpose other than to raise revenue. Thus, a tax does not violate the
principle of equality even when it could change the relative position
of persons vis-A-vis their means as measured by the tax base, in this
case inheritance. Even though the tax may have literally treated all
those in similar circumstances "uniformly and equally," which we
128 Id. at 293 (quoting Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 337 (1885)).
1291d at 294 (quoting Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 165 (1897)
(Brewer, J.)). Note that Justice Brewer filed a dissenting opinion in Magoun. See id. at 301
(arguing that tax law that grades rate of tax on legacies to strangers by amount of legacy is
unequal and violates the Constitution).
130d at 294.
131 See id at 300, where the Court reached its conclusion.
32 Note that in similar circumstances several state courts had found that although one
could treat different items as separate classes, one could not treat different amounts of the same
item as a separate class under general notions of equality. See discussion supra Part V.A.
133 See supra note 125.
134Magoun, 170 U.S. at 300.
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may call horizontal tax equity, its very different application to those
in only slightly different circumstances might be considered quite
disproportionate to the difference. Vertical equity does not just re-
quire that those with different resources be treated differently, but that
they be treated differently in proportion to their difference. 135 The
Court's decision to focip on horizontal equity, while ignoring vertical
equity, promotes only a cursory examination of the rationale behind
the classification and its operation, leading to a limited role for courts.
Indeed, the Court indicated in a later case that it has no role at all
to play in taxation. In its decision upholding the constitutionality of
the federal income tax law, the Court easily dismissed a challenge
under the Fifth Amendment: 
136
[The Due Process Clause] is not a limitation upon the taxing
power .... And no change in the situation here would arise
even if it be conceded, as we think it must be, that this doc-
trine would have no application in a case where although
there was a seeming exercise of taxing power, the act com-
plained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion
that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of
property ... [or] was so wanting in basis for classification as
to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably
lead to the same conclusion. 
137
Though in general the decade beginning in 1930 is marked as the
end of the Supreme Court's interference with any congressional regu-
lation of economic affairs, 138 Brushaber v. Union Pacific indicates
that the Court's role in testing the constitutionality of tax legislation
had lost its significance many years earlier. It might be more accurate
to say that by this time there was no federal doctrine of substantive
equality unless some other important constitutional value was impli-
cated. Justice Frankfurter contrasted the federal position with some
states' views of equality in taxation in the following way: "This Court
has previously had occasion to advert to the narrow and sometimes
cramping provision of these state uniformity clauses, and has left no
doubt that their inflexible restrictions upon the taxing powers of the
state were not to be insinuated into that meritorious conception of
135 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
136Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
137 Id. at 24-25.
138 See Gerald E. Neuman, Equal Protection, "General Equality" and Economic Discrimi-
nation from a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLLIM. J. EuR. L. 281, 284, 291-92 (1999).
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equality which alone the Equal Protection Clause was designed to
assure."1
39
Exactly what is this "meritorious conception of equality" con-
tained in the Fourteenth Amendment? It was by then to be understood
in terms of the appropriate standard of judicial review. In the 1938
case of United States v. Carolene Product Co.,' 4° the Court in a non-
tax case outlined the role of the courts:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is
to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitu-
tional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assump-
tion that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of the legislators.
14 1
The present state of federal equal protection law has led to asser-
tions that equality is an empty concept. 142 This judgment is well-
merited when applied to the testing of economic regulation. A
benchmark case in the Supreme Court's consideration of equal pro-
tection was United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz. 143 Fritz
involved changes to the Railroad Retirement Act, which was a federal
benefit system for railroad workers that paralleled the general Social
Security system. Initially, workers who paid mandatory contributions
or taxes to both systems could qualify for benefits under both sys-
tems. The new Act was meant to eliminate the double benefit but not
the double taxes.
Many employees' benefits had already vested under the old law
due to their contributions and length of service. Through the legisla-
tion, Congress had eliminated vested benefits for those persons who
had not begun to receive benefits but who were no longer employed
by the railroads in the year the amendments took effect. Those who
were still employed were left with full benefits. The Court, however,
found that this disparate treatment did not violate equal protection.
The Court's opinion began with the question of "the appropriate
standard of judicial review to be applied when social and economic
139 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 368 (1940).
1-°304 U.S. 144 (1938).
141 Id. at 152.
1
42 See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing
that the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned). Contra Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of
Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983) (arguing that equality is a
necessary legal principle).
143 449 U.S. 166 (1980), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 960 (1981).
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legislation enacted by Congress is challenged as being violative of the
Fifth Amendment"'" where the legislation is not challenged on the
basis of a suspect classification like race. The test was that when "the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of
that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must be as-
sumed."' 145 This involves an issue of Congressional "power," not
"wisdom,"' 146 and it was power, not rationale or purpose, that carried
the day. The Court concluded:
Applying those principles to this case, the plain language of
§ 231b (h) marks the beginning and end of our inquiry. There
Congress determined that some of those who in the past re-
ceived full windfall benefits would not continue to do so. Be-
cause Congress could have eliminated windfall benefits for
all classes of employees, it is not constitutionally impermissi-
ble for Congress to have drawn lines between groups of em-
ployees for the purposes of phasing out those benefits.1
47
The Court's view was that once Congress distinguished between
classes, the Court was required to search out a plausible reason for
such classification. The Court decided that Congress could have con-
cluded that one class "had a greater equitable claim [than the
other],' 48 that is, that those still employed had a more just claim than
those who were not still employed. According to the majority, once
the Court finds a plausible reason, it is "constitutionally irrelevant
whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.' 49
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that the re-
quirement of equality necessitated more. The tougher standard of the
dissent highlights the discretion the Court extends to the legislature.
The dissent would have required a finding first of "what the purposes
of the statute are, and, second, whether the classification is rationally
related to achievement of those purposes.' 150 Justice Brennan was
troubled by deriving the justification from the classification of the
statute itself,' 5' especially when the justification conflicted with the
'14Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
145 Id. (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911)).
1I6d. at 176.
147 Id. at 176-77 (footnotes omitted).
1
4 Id. at 178.
149Id. at 179 (quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
150Id. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 186-87.
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legislative history's stated purpose to protect vested interests 152 and,
therefore, was not related to Congress's "actual purpose."' 153 Justice
Brennan suggested "that the mode of analysis employed by the Court
in this case virtually immunizes social and economic legislative clas-
sifications from judicial review. '' 54 Thus, the majority's standard
confers virtually total discretion for legislative action. Equality in the
federal system becomes form without content.
Justice Brennan's admonition has particular force in taxation. This
is demonstrated by the case of Madden v. Kentucky, 155 where the
Court found that the presumption of constitutionality can be over-
come only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is
hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes. The Court affirmed that in taxation, even more than in other
fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom of classification.
1 56
The treatment of federal doctrines on equality has so far focused
on the latitude legislators have when their object is essentially to raise
revenues. Taxation, of course, can serve social purposes other than
simply raising revenue. For example,
Tax also performs an expenditure function today .... Income
tax law is utilized to encourage or reward activities
considered to be beneficial from society's perspective,
including, for example, home ownership, health insurance,
pensions, life insurance, and so forth in the noncommercial
context, and tax holidays, accelerated depreciation,
deductions for capital expenditures, credits, and so forth in
the business context. Reducing the tax burden of certain
individuals based on the special character of income or
expense that is not shared by all is the equivalent of a direct
tax expenditure. Thus, the tax structure serves as an
apparatus, indeed a complex, infinitely patterned mosaic,
which reconfigures the burdens of taxpayers on the basis of
political decisions and social values. The aims and purposes
of taxation include the purposeful use of the forms of taxation
to promote economic and social results that are deemed to be
politically desirable. Within the appearance of progressive tax
form based on egalitarian principles of ability to pay through
152 d. at 185. The explanation of this Bill stressed that persons with vested rights were to
be protected.
15 3 Id. at 193.
'54d. at 183.
155 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).1561d. at 87-88.
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the manipulation of the concepts of income, capital,
deductions, depreciation and credits, the obligations of
taxpayers are metamorphosed according to new politically
established principles of social merit. Tax incentives, tax
preferences, and tax loopholes proliferate for those who have
the wherewithal to take advantage. Thus, tax transfer
payments are made through the taxing process that reallocates
the burdens of society among its citizens.
57
The full implications of this important role tax plays undermines the
very essence of classical equality.
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,158 the Supreme
Court provided unequivocal support for the use of the enormous po-
tential of tax law to change society through unequal treatment. The
Court concluded:
Our decision need not, however, rest on the conceptions of
subject, measure and rate of tax. Much broader considerations
touching the state's internal policy of police sustain the
exaction .... Whatever a state may forbid or regulate it may
permit upon condition that a fee be paid in return for the
privilege, and such a fee may be exacted to discourage the
prosecution of a business or to adjust competitive or
economic inequalities. Taxation may be made the implement
of the exercise of the state's police power; and proper and
reasonable discrimination between classes to promote fair
competitive conditions and to equalize economic advantages
is therefore lawful. 1
59
Legislatures are well aware of the enormous capacity of tax provi-
sions to reward or punish. This discretion lodged in the legislature
has, in the case of the United States, led to many special exemptions,
incentives, and preferences aimed at special groups or special indi-
viduals. Legislatures have learned quickly how useful and politically
opaque taxation can be.
The purposes behind such provisions can differ, from giving relief
from a hardship that might reflect the taxpayer's diminished ability to
pay to outright subsidies. Indeed, oftentimes the particular
justification depends solely on the particular values espoused by the
157 See Barker, supra note 23 (manuscript at 13-14).
158 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
159 Id. at 425-26 (footnotes omitted).
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commentator. 6° Without question there are many hardships that may
be created by taxation, so that even in the case of provisions aimed at
relieving some, others are not helped, and distinctions are created that
seriously test the important goals of fairness to taxpayers and equality
of burden.
But many incentives clearly have nothing to do with the objective
of fairness in taxation since their purpose is to treat taxpayers differ-
ently not on the basis of their particular circumstances, including their
benefits received or their ability to pay, but instead on the basis of
public purposes that intentionally distort equality. Only by targeting a
minority for unfair treatment can one demonstrate a violation of
equality under the Supreme Court's test. Granting special provisions
to a few, no matter who they are, at the expense of a larger group, is
acceptable under the equal protection doctrine. These uses are inher-
ently unequal. Nevertheless, state governments do not violate the
equal protection doctrine by giving special tax incentives to particular
industries or specific taxpayers, 16' and tax holidays that subsidize
specific activity do not violate the principle of equality.
One reason for this result is the recognition of the problematic
relationship between taxation and expenditure. "Reducing the tax
burden of certain individuals based on the special character of income
or expense that is not shared by all is the equivalent of a direct tax
expenditure."'' 62 This was recognized in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation in Washington,163 a case involving a special exception
provided for a veterans' organization from the lobbying restrictions
placed upon all other charitable and religious institutions. The result
of this legislation was that the veterans' organization could receive
tax-deductible contributions from people for its lobbying efforts while
other charities could not. The Court concluded that tax exemptions
and deductions are a form of subsidy paid indirectly through the tax
system. These have the same effect as a cash payment to the
organization in the amount of tax it would have had to pay. Thus
160 See Stanley S. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provi-
sions Get Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1957) (arguing that Congress adopts different
tax provisions, which favor special groups that run counter to our conception of tax fairness).
,6' See Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) (holding that tax
exemption for merchandise owned by a non-resident held in a warehouse solely for storage does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
162 Barker, supra note 23 (manuscript at 13); see also Edward A. Zelinksy, Are Tax "Bene-
fits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARv. L. REV. 379, 382 (1998)
(arguing for the replacement of general categories of tax benefits and direct expenditures with a
case-by-case determination of a specific tax and direct spending program's equivalence).
163461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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viewed by the Court, the tax statute was a legislative choice to
subsidize one activity, but not another. 164
Once one views exemptions and such as subsidies, then has one
not separated these discriminations from the tax function? Are we
simply dealing with two acts instead of one, the first being a tax im-
posed equally on all and the second, an expenditure made to one or a
few? If so, what is left of the original notion of equality that no spe-
cial privileges in taxation should be granted? Nothing!
The legislature's ability to grant special privileges to a few is well
illustrated in the case of Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United
States.1 65 This case involved a claim by a taxpayer that the special
relief provisions included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 violated
equal protection. These transition rules "provided specified exemp-
tions from designated provisions of the new tax laws to very, very
few specified favored taxpayers."' 66 The plaintiffs were taxpayers
who had not received special treatment but claimed that they were in
a similar situation to those favored taxpayers. The Court viewed the
relief sought by the plaintiffs as, essentially, preventing the Internal
Revenue Service from enforcing "laws passed by Congress for the
purpose of benefiting only those taxpayers who have political influ-
ence." 67 Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case on the basis
that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing to sue because they
were asserting the rights of a "disfavored class" that included practi-
cally everyone. 168
The problem of standing in the United States presents serious im-
pediments to the assertion of constitutional claims. 169 But even if the
parties had proceeded to the merits, it is quite unlikely that they
would have prevailed. That is because the modem standard for evalu-
ating equal protection claims leaves little room for meaningful review
by the courts. Of course, equal protection is all about treating simi-
larly situated people similarly. Unless the classification infringes a
fundamental constitutional right (other than the right to equality), 170
Congress is given the widest latitude in taxation to make distinctions
between taxpayers. A legislative enactment represents a legislative
determination that the classified persons or objects of taxation are, in
fact, dissimilar. Such a determination cannot be overturned unless the
" Jd. at 549.
1- 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993).
16Id. at 1175.
167 Id. at 1179.
1681d. at 1177-78 (noting plaintiffs suffered no direct injury).
169 See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
170 Regan v. Taxation with Representation in Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983)
(citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)).
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classification does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose. 171 There is no requirement that the legislature
supply this purpose, and the legislation will be sustained as long as
the courts find any justification. 172 Indeed, the taxpayer must "nega-
tive every conceivable basis which might support"'173 the legislative
classification. Though there is a requirement that there be a relation
between justification and classification, the courts only require a
plausible connection, not a provable one. In the case of individualized
relief provisions for special taxpayers, it may be sufficient that Con-
gress concluded that these few individuals faced hardship. Whether
they did or did not is not judicially relevant. Speculation as to whether
the classification was overinclusive is irrelevant; simply unwise legis-
lation is not unconstitutional legislation. Underinclusive classifica-
tions, as alleged by the plaintiff in Apache Bend, can hardly be "a
hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and
classes,"'174 unless motivated by a constitutionally impermissible pur-
pose. Though modern taxation often creates extreme differences in
the taxation of quite economically similar taxpayers, these disparities
have not been viewed as involving the wholesale shifting of the tax
burden from one class to another.
But what if that were the case? Even in the face of large-scale dis-
crimination, in Nordlinger v. Hahn,175 the Supreme Court sustained a
statute on the basis of minimum rationality. In Nordlinger, certain
taxpayers brought an equal protection challenge to Proposition 13,
which was an amendment to the California Constitution that man-
dated a new system for real property taxation. 76 Under that amend-
ment, California abandoned the typical market value or current value
basis for assessing real property and mandated, instead, what can be
called an acquisition value base. The amendment provided that the
annual tax could not exceed one percent of "cash value." Cash value
was "defined as the assessed valuation as of the 1975-1976 tax year
or, 'thereafter, the appraised value of real property when purchased,
newly constructed, or a change in ownership has occurred after the
1975 assessment."",177 The assessed base could increase by no more
than the lesser of two percent or the annual rate of inflation.
178
171 See Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
172 Id.
173 Madden, 309 U.S. at 88 (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61
(1912)).
174 Regan, 461 U.S. at 547 (quoting Madden, 309 U.S. at 87-88).
175505 U.S. I (1992).
176 CAL. CONST. amend. XmA.
177 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 5 (citing CAL. CONST. amend. XmIA, § 2(a)).
178 Id. (citing CAL. CONST. amend. XmIA, § 2(b)).
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What happened could hardly have been unanticipated. Property
values continued to surge in California so that by 1992, when the
Supreme Court reviewed the situation, "dramatic disparities in the
taxes paid by [taxpayers] owning similar pieces of property" had
occurred. 179 It was alleged that when the plaintiff in Nordlinger had
purchased her house in 1988, she was paying about five times more in
taxes than some of her neighbors who owned comparable homes. 180
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the statute was
constitutional.
One can hardly imagine a more striking example of a violation of
the classical concept of equality. Classical equality required taxation
of property according to what one has and that had to be determined
on the basis of market value. While there might have to be exceptions
made for certain types of property like intangibles that might be
difficult to value, such was not the case for real property, which had
been a standard tax base since the eighteenth century. Though there
may be nothing sacrosanct in market value, it is generally considered
the fairest base for generally assessing both benefit and ability. Where
market value is ascertainable, it is considered to be the proper
measurement of the tax base unless there are particular countervailing
factors.
As outlined in the above section on state law, the concept of equal-
ity has recognized legitimate deviation from the requirements of uni-
form rates and value in order to realize social and economic equality
through taxation. In Nordlinger, the Court was able to satisfy itself
that there were certain social goals that provided the justification for
the legislation.
Equality is all about determining who equals are. At first blush,
one might think that when considering a tax on real property, those
who have the same house, as defined by size, condition, neighbor-
hood, etc., that is, value, are similarly situated. According to the state
government's classification, they were not. In fact, only those that
have the same house acquired at the same time are similarly situated.
In Nordlinger, two state interests were deemed sufficient to justify
the seemingly odd distinction between newer and older owners. The
first was the state's interest in "local neighborhood preservation, con-
tinuity, and stability."' 8' The second was its interest in protecting
older owners' reliance interests in the continued level of tax.' 82 The
Court developed both of these purposes without any real guidance
179 Id. at 6.
180 Id. at 7.
181 Id. at 12.
192 d. at 12-13.
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from those who enacted the law, in this case the people of the State of
California who ratified the constitutional amendment. It does not take
a crystal ball to understand that the real purpose of those who voted
for the law (the existing homeowners) was to cap their property taxes
at the expense of newcomers. The law was generally known as the
"Welcome Stranger" law.
83
The first justification found by the Court was that the tax law was
used to accomplish some non-tax public purpose. When this is done,
by definition, inequality is consciously created in order to accomplish
some end. Under the Court's test, the protection afforded to taxpayers
by equal protection ends as soon as any plausible rationale is ascer-
tained. The Court does not require that the discrimination is likely to
achieve the particular result. This is due to the fact that rarely is more
than minimal rationality needed to establish a classification's ten-
dency to accomplish the government's purpose.
Even the Court recognized that "California's grand experiment ap-
pears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of
society .... "184 This does not sound like the same group that was
thought to justify the classification, that is, the "lower income fami-
lies" that could have been displaced by rising taxes on their proper-
ties.185 One might legitimately speculate that low-income property
owners were a small minority among the well-off majority who more
substantially benefited from this legislation. Classifications based on
taxpayers' abilities to pay are natural and legitimate purposes of tax
legislation.1 86 The gross overinclusiveness of Proposition 13 seriously
challenges its alleged justification and completely robs the means of
any legitimate proportionality to their ends.
Equality not only requires that similarly-situated people be treated
the same, but also permits, or even requires, that dissimilarly situated
people be treated dissimilarly. What is similar or dissimilar depends
on the features that are relevant to the comparison. What Justice Ste-
vens pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Nordlinger is that mere
classification by the legislature should not be accepted as proof of
rationally based dissimilarity. 87 Thus, the legislative choice of rele-
vance must be justified by a purpose outside the classification itself.
There should be more than just conjecture that the classification has a
183 CAL. CONST. amend. XRA (1978).
' ld. at 18.
5Id. at 12.
' See Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935) (discussing the validity of a graduated
tax scheme imposing higher tax rates upon chain service stations than on independent service
stations).
'7Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rational likelihood of accomplishing the ends. As noted in the dissent,
"Proposition 13 is too blunt a tool to accomplish such a specialized
goal. 188
One could posit a different way an enlightened electorate in Cali-
fornia could have proceeded. To curb the abuse of fiercely escalating
taxes, California voters could have capped property tax increases for
all instead of only for existing homeowners. Such a law would have
fully accomplished all the legitimate purposes of the Tax Act. Instead,
the majority intentionally placed a disproportionate burden of in-
creased taxes on a minority.
Even in a democratic society, it is the obvious consequence of
power that one group will try to shift its burden to others. The notion
of equality finds that outcome repugnant. Under the modem federal
view of equality in taxation, public purposes irrelevant to the raising
of revenue can be furthered through the tax system by placing inordi-
nately unequal burdens on some for the benefit of others without any
requirement that the system of reward and punishment have a signifi-
cant relationship to the goal.
Reflecting on the federal experience, it is apparent that equality
has little force. Its current status is the result of a clear decision by the
courts in the 1930s to reduce their supervision of tax legislation in
order to free legislatures from constraints on the use of economic and
tax law and regulation to accomplish important social goals. It has
been said of this era that the Court freed up the government to allow it
the possibility of becoming a social state, 89 thus, allowing legisla-
tures to address economic inequality without being hamstrung by the
liberal rights tradition of equality. 190 The result was to create what has
been called the empty idea of equality. Equality here is not form to be
made determinate by a court that supplies its content, but it is instead
form without any content.
By freeing government from a liberal rights view of equality,
American society is not only free to become socialistic, but is also
free to become its opposite. Dominant classes are free to shift the
burden of government to others. In Nordlinger, even the California
state government recognized that the "inequity is clear."' 9' A young
couple buying a home could be taxed at five times the amount of a
188 Id. at 37-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189 See Neuman, supra note 138, at 298-99.
190See Peter Westin, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
191 Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 29-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing SENATE COMM'N ON
PROP. TAX EQUITY AND REVENUE, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM'N ON PROP. TAX EQUITY
AND REVENUE TO THE CAL. STATE SENATE, S. 1991-581, at 9-10 (1991)).
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young couple that inherited a similar home. 192 A person who buys a
home in 1988 for $170,000 in a middle class neighborhood would pay
substantially the same tax as the long-time owner of a Malibu beach
property worth $2,000,000. 193 Thus, we have come about face from
the original notion of equality. In the words of the dissent in Nordlin-
ger, "Such a law establishes a privilege of a medieval character: Two
families with equal needs and equal resources are treated differently
solely because of their different heritage."' 94 In the abstract, vast dif-
ferentials in taxation between taxpayers can be freely created without
any comprehension of their actual respective abilities to pay. In the
concrete, it is more likely than not that the more prosperous home-
owner or business owner pays substantially less than the less affluent
person who came to property ownership at a later date.
C. The Concept of Equality in Germany
The review of acts of the legislature in terms of constitutional
norms in a manner analogous to judicial review in the United States
developed quite recently in Germany. While its roots could be clearly
perceived in the Weimar Republic, it did not emerge as a real force
until after World War ]I. 195 The types of judicial control, however, are
quite different. The United States follows what has been called the
"decentralized" model, whereby "the power of control [is given] to all
the judicial organs of a given legal system."' 196 Germany follows the
"centralized" model, which "confines the power of review to one sin-
gle judicial organ."'197 In Germany, this power is assigned to the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court. 9 8 In America, constitutional testing can
only take place in the context of an actual case or controversy in
which the litigant has a concrete interest in the outcome; this is the
requirement of standing. A regime of centralized review, like Ger-
many's, permits the abstract testing of legislation. 99 For example, the
Federal Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to review the compati-
bility of legislation with the Basic Law when requested by "the Fed-
92Id.
193Id. at7.
194 Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTrrUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 6-7 (Duke Univ. Press 1997) (exploring the history, structure, and
operation of the German judicial system).
196 CAPPELLETri & COHEN, supra note 46, at 73.
197Id.
18See KOMMERS, supra note 195, at 10.
199 Id. at 13.
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eral Government, a Land government, or of one third of the Members
of the Bundestag.
' 200
Several countries in Europe have specific constitutional provisions
that govern legislative power over taxation. 20' The German Constitu-
tion, like the United States Constitution, has only a general provision
on equality. The Basic Law provides, "All persons are equal before
the law., 20 2 This provision might suggest that equality means no more
than that the relationship between citizen and state is governed by the
rule of law. To the contrary, the Federal Constitutional Court has been
quite active in reviewing tax legislation with respect to a value-
oriented concept of equality, and in several important cases has found
that certain tax measures violate the principles of equality.
Initially, the methodology and standard of review that was utilized
in testing tax legislation by the concept of equality appears quite simi-
lar to that established by the United States Supreme Court, which
applies a stricter scrutiny when legislation involves a suspect classifi-
cation, like race, and only a rational basis test in all other cases. In
Germany, when legislation implicates specific constitutional protec-
tions other than the general requirement of equality or affects a par-
ticularly identified group, the standard of review is heightened and
can be summarized as follows: first, one asks whether the purpose of
the discrimination is a legitimate public goal; second, one asks
whether the means selected are appropriate and necessary to achieve
that goal; and third, one asks whether the disadvantages imposed on a
class are adequately related and proportionate to the desired goal.203
In cases where overt discrimination against particular taxpayers does
not involve critical social interests, the Federal Constitutional Court
then follows what can be called a minimum rationality or rational
basis test that only asks whether government action is clearly arbi-
2°GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 93, cl. 1, pt. 2 (F.R.G.), translated in
7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 21, at 74.
201See for example, CONSTITUCION [C.E.] art. 31, cl. I (Spain), translated in
17 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 21, which provides: "All
shall contribute to the sustenance of public expenditures according to their economic capacity
through a just tax system based on the principle of equality and progressiveness, which in no
case shall be of a confiscatory scope." And, see COSTrruzIONE [COST.] art. 53 (Italy), translated
in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 21, at 11, which provides:
"All shall contribute to public expenditure in accordance with their means. The system of taxa-
tion shall be based on criteria of progression."
202 GG art. 3, cl. 1, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, su-
pra note 21 (providing equality before the law).
203 See Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court,
5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 263 (1999) (exploring equality as the most important yet elusive
concept in German jurisprudence).
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trary.201 One finds much that is alike; however, there is a substantial
difference in degree.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Federal
Constitutional Court has reached some significant decisions on the
limitations of the power to tax based on the requirement of equality.
In some cases, the Constitutional Court has developed a different
notion of equality than what is found in the United States. The
Constitutional Court's notion is derived from the concept of a social
state that is based on the conception of the Constitutional Court's role
as "trustee of a certain legal, moral, and political model, rather than a
guardian of human rights., 20 5 This has led the Constitutional Court to
limit legislative power in some cases by a method that adopts equality
in substance. Even where tax legislation does not implicate some
other important constitutional value, the Constitutional Court has
adopted a much tougher standard for testing legislation by carefully
examining the relation between classification and results to determine
if the tax legislation justifies the purpose for which it was enacted.2°
This approach is particularly reminiscent of that taken in dissents to
the United States Supreme Court's decisions on equal protection.
20 7
These cases can be usefully described as having adopted concepts of
equality in form and equality in practice.
1. Substantive Notions of Equality in Germany
Germany's completely unique contribution on equality was devel-
oped from the concept of the social state. The German cases tested tax
statutes against the requirement of equality with a heightened level of
scrutiny due to the presence of certain fundamental requirements in
the Basic Law that are not present in the United States Constitution.
These constitutional values include the basic right of human dignity20 8
and the basic right to special protection by the state for institutions of
marriage and family.2°9 These cases also reflect a jurisprudence of
constitutional adjudication that is quite different from that found in
the United States. The Federal Constitutional Court views the Basic
Law as a foundational normative structure that commands the devel-
204 Id. at 256-62.
205Id. at 31.
206See KOMMERS, supra note 195, at 290.
2°7See supra notes 147-50, 181-82, and accompanying text.
N8GG art. 1, cl. 1, translated in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD,
supra note 21 ("Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state
authority.").
209 Id. at art. 6, cl. 1 ("Marriage and the family are under the special protection of the
State.").
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opment of the social state. 210 This places an affirmative duty on the
Constitutional Court. Equality is not only a prescription against cer-
tain legislative acts, but also contains a positive command to legisla-
tures to advance certain critical social goals through legislation. The
Constitutional Court was established to promote this outcome.
These constitutional provisions have led the Constitutional Court
to give new meaning and importance to the requirement of equality.
Though the Basic Law adopted after World War II did not have a
specific provision on the requirements of appropriate taxation, the
Court developed out of the principle of equality the requirement that
the legislature levy taxes in accordance with the principle of ability to
pay. 211 Though it did not appear in the Basic Law, the Weimar
Constitution previously articulated the requirement of taxation in
accordance with ability to pay, stating that "[a]H citizens, without
exception, contribute in proportion to their means to all public taxes,
in accordance with the provisions of the laws. 212
The Constitutional Court first applied these principles to a statute
that required the joint assessment of husband and wife.213 The statute
was void214 because it violated the principle of individual taxation by
trying to accomplish an impermissible purpose-trying to bring the
employed wife back to the home.215 Though the Constitutional Court
recognized that "it is constitutionally permissible to impose a tax for
other purposes besides collecting revenue, 216 those purposes had to
reflect appropriate values.
In a later case, the Constitutional Court was asked to determine
whether widowed or unmarried persons with a dependent child were
being treated equally with married parents where the income tax law
did not provide any tax relief for the additional costs of child care.2 17
21 Hans Gribnau, General Introduction to THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN EUROPEAN
TAXATION, supra note 3, at 19.
211 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 7, 2003,
108 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 351 (F.R.G.), discussed in
Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: Ger-
many and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REv. 259, 322-23 (2005).
212GG of 1919, art. 134, translated in CONSTITUTIONs THAT MADE HISTORY, supra note
17, at 378-79.213 BVerfG Jan. 17, 1957, 6 BVerfGE 55, excerpted in KOMMERS, supra note 195, at 495-
96. 214 "[T]he Constitutional Court may hold laws or regulations that it considers unconstitu-
tional either null and void (nichtig) or incompatible (unvereinbar) with the Basic Law. When
held to be nichtig, the statute immediately ceases to operate; when declared unvereinbar, the
statute or legal norm is held to be unconstitutional but not void, and it remains in force during a
transition period pending its correction by the legislature... " KOMMERS, supra note 195, at
52-53.2 15 Id. at 497.
216 Id.
217 BVerfG Mar. 11, 1982, 61 BVerfGE 319 (345); see also the discussion in Klaus Vogel
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The Constitutional Court determined that this was an unjustified bur-
den on these individuals. Hence, the principle of equality in taxation
led to the conclusion that equality unambiguously mandated that taxes
be assessed in accordance with a taxpayer's ability to pay.
In this case, the Constitutional Court was clearly concerned with
features of the income tax law that were outside the normal theoreti-
cal description of the tax base, that is, net income. Income measure-
ment, as a general theoretical matter, requires the deduction of costs
associated with income production, but excludes personal or family
expenses, which are considered personal consumption. Indeed, the
principal understanding of classical equality theory is that economic
capacity is measured solely by actual resources in a given tax base.
The concept of equality in Germany views resources as only the
starting point. To be taxed, resources must be truly available. Thus,
the Constitutional Court considers expenditures that are "necessities,"
those that are unavoidable, to be relevant to appropriate and equal
taxation. Expenses for child care presented just such an inescapable
additional burden for single individuals and could not be ignored by
the Bundstag without violating the principle of equality. In the United
States, in contrast, taking these personal consumption items into con-
sideration in order to achieve social goals outside the tax system
would be viewed as a matter of discretionary legislative policy. The
United States Constitution is seen as a declaration of political forms
and rights, not economic or social ones.
Later, the principle that income tax should tax only true economic
capacity led the Constitutional Court to conclude that an amount rep-
resenting the necessities of life, that is, a minimum subsistence
amount, should be excluded from the tax base. The right of human
dignity required the legislature to treat taxpayers according to their
ability to pay, which meant that the legislature must leave the tax-
payer with income free from tax in an amount necessary to meet the
minimum requirements for a dignified existence. Thus, a minimum
level, set by the Constitutional Court, must be deducted from the tax
base.2
18
Two later cases also involved married persons and taxation in ac-
cordance with ability to pay. In the first, the Constitutional Court held
that a person who paid alimony to a former spouse should be entitled
& Christian Waldhoff, Gennany, in THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALrrY IN EUROPEAN TAXATION,
supra note 3, at 89, 91-92.
218 BVerfG Sept. 25, 1992, 87 BVerfGE 153. See also Vogel & Waldhoff, supra note 217,
at 97-98 (discussing that a minimum level of income must remain tax free to assure equality
according to ability to pay).
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to a deduction as long as the recipient spouse consented.1 9 Sharing
the benefit of the tax deduction between the parties was required un-
der the law.
The second arose under legislation that allowed a taxpayer to de-
duct the cost of a second home for up to two years when he had been
transferred temporarily for employment purposes. 220 A married cou-
ple contested the limitation arguing that they were required to con-
tinue to maintain a second home because the spouse who had not
been transferred remained gainfully employed in the area of the first
home. The Constitutional Court found that the limitation violated the
requirement of equality since it put an unreasonable burden on mar-
ried couples that could not move their homes to the new location for
valid reasons of employment or business. Once again, failure to take
this into consideration violated the notion of taxation according to
ability to pay.
2. Formal Notions of Equality in Germany
The wealth tax case 221 and the inheritance and gift tax case2 22 are
two important cases from the point of view of their cost to the Ger-
man Treasury. In these cases, the Constitutional Court applied a clas-
sical concept of equality reminiscent of the approach previously taken
by many state courts in America.2 3 In both cases, the issue centered
on the methods used to value property subject to the tax. Multiple
methods had been used. For example, securities were valued at mar-
ket value, and business property and some real estate were valued at
capitalized earnings. Nonproductive real estate was valued on a fixed
formula that was totally out of sync with the "market values" derived
in the other cases. Thus, taxing all properties at the same rates re-
sulted in certain properties being taxed disproportionately to others.
The Constitutional Court concluded that these provisions violated the
principle of equality. 2 4
As was seen when considering the American state experience, tax-
ing property on an equal and uniform basis can be extremely prob-
lematic due to the difficulties of valuing consistently. In many cases,
such difficulties have led governments to give up and to categorize
property separately and tax it differently according to category.
219 108 BVerfGE, supra note 211.
22 BVerfG Dec. 4, 2002, 107 BVerfGE 27, discussed in Ordower, supra note 211, at 303.
22 BVerfG June 22, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 121. See also Vogel & Waldhoff, supra note 217,
at 98.
2BVerfG June 22, 1995 93 BVerfGE 165. See also Ordower, supra note 211, at 301.
223 See supra Part V.A.
224 See Ordower, supra note 211, at 301.
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Equality typically requires that once a classification is made, taxes
must be equal and uniform within that classification. This can be a
difficult standard to meet when governments use broad-based taxes
like wealth or inheritance and gift taxes.225 In many cases, courts
permit substantial deviation on the basis of efficiency and administra-
tive convenience. Exceptions are usually permitted with minimum
scrutiny. Yet, the Constitutional Court rejected two fairly broad-based
taxes, the wealth tax and the inheritance and gift tax, which are con-
sistent with a taxpayer's ability to pay and can be easily adapted to
progressive forms of taxation.
3. Equality in the Application of the Tax Law in Germany2 26
Two of the most dramatic cases decided by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court involved inequalities resulting from the application of the
tax law, not from the letter of the law. The first involved the income
taxation of interest.227 The statute was tarnished by the significant
failure of the revenue authorities to enforce provisions of the law.
Due to the lack of withholding at source and the absence of any real
effort at enforcement, there was widespread evasion by taxpayers
who failed to include interest income in their tax returns. The Consti-
tutional Court determined that since only honest taxpayers paid any
tax on their interest, this provision violated the principle of equal-ity.228 Ability to pay in this case became a mandate for identical tax
burdens when it came to one item of income. Similarly, in a later
case, a provision for the taxation of speculative gains in securities,
that is, gains from the sale of securities occurring within six months
of purchase, was held to violate the principle of equality.229 The situa-
tion was quite similar to that of the case of taxation of interest in that
the administration had made almost no effort at enforcement. The
statute had neither provided a withholding mechanism for the tax, nor
included any requirement that financial intermediaries report the
transactions to the tax authorities. Indeed, the government had not
225 The German Bundstag subsequently changed the valuation rules for real property for
inheritance and gift tax purposes. It has not changed the wealth tax rules and that tax regime has
not been in effect since 1997. Id. at 325 n.479.226 Law in action is the law as applied and lived by the laws' interpreters including not only
the professional classes, but also the private parties to whom the law applies. See William B.
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law To Promote Democratic Policy: The
Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109 PENN ST.
L. REv. 703, 723 (2005). It is the perception of the people, in the first instance, that often deter-
mines what the law really means.
227 BVerfG Jun. 27, 1991, 84 BVerfGE 239. See also Neuman, supra note 138, at 309.
2n id.
229 BVerfG Mar. 9, 2004, 110 BVerfGE 94. See also Ordower, supra note 211, at 264.
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even tried to enforce the tax through audit. The Constitutional Court
found that the tax was easily avoided, which rendered the tax unequal
for honest taxpayers.23°
The Constitutional Court's holding a statute unconstitutional be-
cause of the ineptitude of its administration is quite unique. It is also
unusual in terms of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court,
since the case did not implicate any important constitutional value
other than the general provision on equality. This was not a situation
where the classification failed the rational basis test; there was noth-
ing improper with taxing all who fell within the class. Indeed, al-
though the Constitutional Court rested its decision on the notion of
ability to pay, this is not the same concept that requires governments
to assess the populace in terms of their real economic capacity taking
into consideration their needs. Instead, this was formal equality ap-
plied to the real tax base. The Constitutional Court singled out one
element of income-interest, or speculative gains-as the relevant
factor in determining whether two taxpayers are equal. Honest tax-
payers whose means include interest income are to be treated the
same as dishonest taxpayers whose means include interest income.
Only the status of specific taxpayers matters for comparison, not the
underlying economic capability of taxpayers in general.
One might ask what has happened to taxation according to true
ability to pay. Those whose income consists predominantly of wages
might seek to know why the burden of supporting the government is
shifted to them. If ability to pay is the underlying requirement, should
not those with equal incomes, derived from capital, interest, labor, or
any other source, be considered similar?
The Constitutional Court's decision to send a clear message to the
legislature that equality matters results in some confusion as to the
value system reflected in the concept of equality. These decisions
confer a privilege on those with financial gains; this is not taxation in
accordance with the Constitutional Court's value-rich notion of abil-
ity to pay or social equality, but taxation based on formal equality and
uniformity.
Thus, in some cases, two taxpayers are compared on the basis that
a single item in the tax base must be treated the same. In other cases,
the Constitutional Court removes an item from the tax base for
separate treatment. In a way, the Constitutional Court's decision was
a resurrection of classical notions of equality. The traditional classical
notion of equality, however, would have found the income tax law in
its entirety lacking because it had allowed a substantial exemption
230 See id.
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from its natural coverage. The obvious conclusion would have been
that the entire law was invalid. Instead, the Constitutional Court
applied classical equality in a way that treated the administrative
inaction as something that it was not, a purposeful legislative sub-
classification. Under formal equality, classifying interest as a separate
tax base would result in uniformity of treatment of all in the sub-
classifications.
Thus, Germany accepts several different normative roles for the
concept of equality in the same system. For the most part, Germany
adopts the American federal view that legislatures should be free to
use the tax law to advance whatever social interests are deemed desir-
able in the legislature's eyes. Thus, legislatures in exercising their
power to tax have the primary responsibility for directing public pol-
icy. Legislation does not violate equality if it gives special treatment
to some taxpayers but not to others as long as such treatment does not
231result in a significant detriment to the others. While tax preferences
and incentives that benefit the few at the expense of the many fly in
the face of taxation in accordance with ability to pay, they could
hardly run afoul of the principle of equality unless they were so lack-
ing in justification as to be arbitrary.
In other areas, that is, areas asserting other important constitutional
values, the Constitutional Court insists that the legislature apply a
distributive notion of ability to pay. The Constitutional Court makes
marriage or children a relevant factor for determining who is equal
with whom, thus, restricting the legislature from adversely affecting
those institutions through tax. The Constitutional Court also finds that
helping to alleviate poverty is an affirmative duty of income taxation
by requiring that income tax exempt a minimum subsistence amount.
Lastly, the Constitutional Court embraces formal notions of equality
and uniformity. By finding fault with wealth and inheritance taxes
because their reach is uneven among the more affluent members of
society, the Constitutional Court removes a tax directed at promoting
a progressive sharing of the tax burden. By finding a violation of
equality in terms of taxing interest and speculative gains, the
Constitutional Court removes items from the tax base that are earned
in larger proportion by high income taxpayers, again reducing the
progressivity of the system. This is done on the basis of a more
individual rights focused principle of equality.
23 Vogel & Waldhoff, supra note 217, at 113-14.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The three faces of equality have been described as classical, social,
and popular. Classical equality is an individual, rights-based principle
that limits government action that aims oppressive measures at certain
taxpayers while giving unwarranted privileges to others. It is a nega-
tive force that controls government action through the principle of
formal equality. Social equality is a communal, group-based principle
that relies on a constitutional vision of a more equal society premised
on a fairer distribution of resources. It can hold both negative and
positive force by permitting judicial intervention in tax law to ensure
that the state takes action to move toward a more just system. Popular
equality is popularly constituted equality. Its content is a matter of
current political choice. Since the legislature is representative of cur-
rent mores, the legislature should have the discretion as to equality's
content. Consequently, popular equality deprives equality of positive
force, relegating it to a matter of inspirational value. All three faces of
equality reflect value systems that determine the judicial role.
Equality, as an explicit command of the legal system, shared its
conception with the early birth pangs of constitutional democracy. As
this form of political and social organization developed, so too did the
principle of equality. In theory, equality is about the just treatment of
the people by the government of the people. In practice, changing
values supply equality's content.
The classical approach developed in a time when government was
perceived as resulting from individual transfers of power, and
government was required to respect its own limitations. The formal
notions of equality had their greatest force in an era of more simple
economics and social relations. They reflected the importance of the
courts' role in a more limited government and heightened emphasis
on individual property and economic rights.
As democracy changed over the course of the nineteenth century,
the social structure and the economic scene also changed dramati-
cally. Many began to see government as a powerful instrument for
economic and social change. Demand for a more economically equi-
table division of resources increased. In this light, classical equality
was seen to prevent taxation from reaching its enormous potential to
cure economic inequality. Thus, Locke's contract theory of tax equal-
ity gave way to an egalitarian theory of equality that treated people
equally by requiring equal sacrifice and permitting progressive forms
of taxation. The judicial role as the guardian of individual rights also
diminished. Mostly by choice, but in some American states by the
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constitutional amendment of equality clauses, the courts relinquished
this power to the legislature and to the executive branch.
There is a large difference among the three court systems exam-
ined in this paper. In America, the states have struggled with the prin-
ciples of classical equality in terms of the requirements of modem
society and have tried to accommodate both classical and popular
views. The federal regime has freed the legislature from all vestiges
of equality determination, so that the legislature can focus on carrying
out the popular social agenda. In the United States, the personal cir-
cumstances and needs of the taxpayer are not relevant factors in the
quest for equality because there is no constitutional requirement to
help those who are less fortunate.
Germany also experiences the tension between classical and popu-
lar principles of equality. In stark contrast to the American experi-
ence, the Federal Constitutional Court has found in the Basic Law a
mandated conception of a particular social state that requires an egali-
tarian notion of equality. The Constitutional Court asserts its power to
insist that the legislature promote certain social values that lead to
greater economic equality. Whereas the United States Supreme Court
has found that judicial supervision is particularly inappropriate in the
area of tax, the Constitutional Court has adopted the principle that
equality has even greater force in matters of taxation. The Constitu-
tional Court's aggressive review of tax legislation reflects taxation's
importance as a most efficient engine for social change.
Justice in taxation based on the modem value-rich notion of ability
to pay has abandoned its roots in John Stuart Mill's utilitarian phi-
losophies. In finding just taxation on the basis of ability to pay, Mill
recognized different views on what would be the result of equal sacri-
fices by each taxpayer. As has been persuasively argued, the proof is
lacking as to whether equal sacrifice leads to progressive, propor-
tional, or even regressive taxation.232 Mill concluded that "from these
confusions there is no other mode of extraction than the utilitarian. 233
Utilitarianism strives for the maximization of societal wealth with-
out regard to who benefits. Utility does not recognize individual
rights as an a priori restraint on government powers. Justice requires
only those measures that maximize utility. A social welfare state that
232 RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 211-12 (McGraw Hill 1976). Steven Utz has described the origin of the justification
of tax according to ability to pay in early utilitarian thought. See STEVEN UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN
INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPLE DEBATES 41 (West 1993). Once it is recognized
that the theory of equal sacrifice does not justify progressive taxation, ability to pay as distribu-
tive justice may produce results clearly at variance with utilitarianism.
233John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT, Everyman's Library 156 (N.Y. EP Dutton & Co. 1926).
2006]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
values significant redistribution of wealth may not promote utilitarian
justice.2"
The Federal Constitutional Court's conclusion that ability to pay
should be the guiding supernorm of the tax system must be
recognized as a rejection of utilitarian economic principles. In
contrast, the American federal experience is the ultimate utilitarian
approach to tax. Utilitarian goals give little role for individual rights
since the value perspective of utilitarianism requires the maximization
of total social utility. Rights like equality should not be a restraint on
this just social outcome because it is irrelevant to utilitarian goals how
wealth is distributed. 235 To Rawls, what would be considered just by
individuals enshrouded in a veil of ignorance would necessitate the
assumption that each individual would vote to test all laws by the
standard of whether they would make the least well off member of
society better off.2 36 To a utilitarian, the veil of ignorance would
instead result in a vote to test all laws in terms of whether they would
increase society's welfare, thus making society better off.
2 37
The American standard of review of equal protection promotes a
purely utilitarian approach. There is no intrinsic merit in a value sys-
tem; one adopts a method for its effect. For example, a doctrine of
taxation that ignores means could be accepted, like the doctrine of
supply-side or trickle-down economics, which argues that reducing
taxes, especially for businesses and the well-to-do, stimulates savings
and investment and in turn benefits all members of a society. On the
other hand, the doctrine "from each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs ' 238 would be just as proper if it were effective
to maximize society's utility.
In the United States, consequently, whether taxation shall be im-
posed in accordance with ability to pay or rather according to privi-
lege is a matter of social and political struggle. In 1913, this struggle
led to a constitutional amendment permitting Congress to enact the
most comprehensive income tax of its time. The system was enacted
because it reflected most clearly the principle of ability to pay.239
3 From a utilitarian perspective, legal policy should exclusively promote general welfare
and no independent weight should be given to fairness. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shevell, Fair-
ness v. Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REv. 961, 1030 (2001).
235 Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Equity Norms: A Call for Utilitarian-
ism, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 497, 502-03 (1995).
2 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE 3-53 (Harvard Press 1971).
237 Kaplow, supra note 235, at 502-03.
238 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, in 2 KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGLES,
SELECrED WORKS 24 (Moscow For. Lang. Pub. House 1955).
239 See Barker, supra note 40, at 860-61 (discussing the origins of the ability to pay taxa-
tion in the United States).
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Over time, Congress has diluted these egalitarian principles. 24 In
contrast, in Germany, the constitutional requirement that tax burdens
reflect equality and ability to pay represent values of justice the courts
hold more sacred than utility. The question remains as to equality's
strength in the face of utility.
Treating people equally according to their ability to pay requires
three elements. There must be a proper assessment of their means,
that is, the resources available to them. There must also be an
assessment of their needs according to societal standards reflecting
society's values. Finally, the system must reflect a value judgment as
to the proper rate structure: progressive, proportional, or regressive.
The first element primarily requires practical economic judgment
coupled with social choices as to which system of taxation best
reflects societal values. The second requires economic judgment in
the context of debatable decisions concerning need. The third
determines how government's need for revenue will be distributed
among people on the basis of social choice or philosophy as to what
constitutes equal sacrifice.
The first also confronts the timeless debate as to what is the most
just tax base: income, wealth, gratuitous transfers, or consumption.
Adam Smith believed the most equitable tax was one on income be-
cause income reflected the benefit a taxpayer derived from the
state.241 Hobbes, in The Leviathan, viewed the most equitable tax as
242
one on consumption. The income base reflects economic capacity
in terms of what is actually available to pay taxes, whereas the con-
sumption base, which excludes savings, reflects economic capacity in
terms of what should be considered available to pay taxes since fore-
243gone consumption is believed to benefit society.
Most countries use both consumption and income taxes. Even
though both bases can reflect the personal circumstances and needs of
taxpayers, the consumption taxes used today are transactional taxes
that reflect neither. Thus, a tax base that truly reflects ability to pay
must be a personal one, like income or a personal expenditure (or
consumption) tax. The general adoption of personal income taxes,
rather than personal consumption taxes reflects current societal be-
2OId. In commenting on the 1913 Federal Income Tax Law, the legislative history pro-
vided: "The tax upon incomes is levied according to ability to pay, and it would be difficult to
devise a tax fairer or cheaper [system] of collection." H.R. Rep. No. 63-5, at XXXVII (1913).
For a complete discussion of the context of this legislation, see Barker, supra note 40, at 860-
61.
241 SMrrH, supra note 22.
242 THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 158 (George Routledge & Sons 1887).
243 It is interesting to note that John Rawls accepted these anti-distributive notions of jus-
tice as appropriate in taxation without much analysis. See RAWLS, supra note 236, at 278.
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liefs that economic capacity to pay taxes is best reflected by including
"saved" income in the tax base. In other words, excluding accumula-
tions in wealth is taxation according to the principle from those who
are mean to those who have means. Clearly, personal taxation also
has the largest potential to affect social and economic behavior and,
thus, has the largest potential within itself to realize the opposite of
equality.
Adoption of a personal expenditure tax, even though it does not
adhere well to the principle of ability to pay, would most likely sur-
vive a minimum rationality test in America. In Germany, however,
according to the Federal Constitutional Court, the Basic Law's prin-
ciple of equality "forbids any regulation imposing a tax for which the
ability to pay is not a principle consideration.', 244 The special value
encapsulated in the German principle of equality and ability to pay
requires, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, progressive
taxation: "Here justice demands that relative equality for a more pow-
erful economic performer means that taxes must be paid according to
a higher percentage rate than an economically weaker person.
' '245
Though the principle of equality might prevent the Bundestag from a
wholesale abandonment of income taxation for expenditure taxation,
equality does not appear to prevent German legislators from accom-
plishing much the same thing by importing consumption tax notions
and other tax preference inequalities into the income tax system.
Personal taxes have the greatest innate potential to realize equal-
ity's objectives. The use of progressive principles to achieve a fairer
distribution of resources, however, is also equality's Achilles' heel,
for progressivity dominates every aspect of the income tax system,
including an income tax's ability to influence behavior by granting
preferences, incentives, and tax holidays without regard to ability to
pay. One example to the contrary is the American State of Pennsyl-
vania where one can find a consistent effort to ensure that the income
tax base reflects true economic capacity undiminished by the legisla-
ture's planned use of inequality to accomplish social objectives
through the tax law.
Other nonpersonal forms of taxation cannot truly conform to the
more modem social construct of ability to pay. Many taxes select
bases without an attempt to measure comprehensively a person's
available resources. This is particularly true of property and sales
taxes. But even where there is an attempt to tax consumption broadly,
2
" Vogel & Waldhoff, supra note 217, at 98.
245 Id. at 92 (citing BVerfG Jun. 24, 1958, 8 BVerfGE 51 (68)).
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as is the case of the value-added tax (VAT),246 the base is regressive,
even without its exemptions, with those with less means paying pro-
portionally more. Whereas income is an excellent indicator of actual
ability to pay, consumption taxes rely on the understanding that vol-
untary participation in market transactions indicates ability, even
though tax payments will often be substituted for necessities.
Since consumption patterns poorly reflect ability to pay, govern-
ments sometimes try to bring progressive principles to consumption
taxes, especially in the case of the VAT. Multiple rates represent leg-
islative determinations as to which products are more likely to be
consumed by those who are better off. Where the judgment is good,
these taxes tend to create appropriate distinctions between those in the
middle class, but still tend to be regressive as wealth accumulates
because higher income taxpayers have more choices as to how they
use their resources.
Thus, in Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court accepts a fic-
tion that those taxes extant at the promulgation of the Basic Law em-
body the principle of ability to pay.247 A more honest response is that
taxes are different and that different principles of equality operate in
different systems of taxation. Social equality works well where one
directly takes the individual circumstances of taxpayers into account.
Where the application of social equality to nonpersonal taxes relies on
insecure generalizations, there is a strong case for following the more
formal precepts of classical equality by treating all resources the same
except to the extent clear differences are demonstrable. This is an
approach that could be compatible with the present jurisprudence of
the Federal Constitutional Court.
The three faces of equality conjure very different images. Classical
equality, which was designed to protect eighteenth century bourgeois
from both king and proletariat, values an individual's rights against
privilege and spoliation. Social equality values a tax system that leads
to economic equality. Popular equality values the relativity of democ-
ratic will. All three faces of equality bear upon the conception of a
just tax system. One learns, however, that neither an uncontrolled
legislature nor an active court has yet to create a just allocation of tax
burdens in accordance with the principle of equality.
246 See generally VALUE-ADDED TAX (Henry J. Aaron, ed., 1982).
247 Vogel & Waldhoff, supra note 217, at 90.
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